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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Van Bergen, S., Merckelbach, H., & Jelicic, M. (2006). Je eigen geheugen 
wantrouwen: Een riskante zaak? [Memory distrust: Risky business?]. De 
Psycholoog, 41, 664–669. 
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Memory distrust is a phenomenon that is familiar to most of us. Most people 
now and then start to doubt their own memory, for example, whether or 
not they have locked the door. Sometimes, memory distrust may cause real 
trouble. An anecdotal example of this is provided by the Olympic winter 
games of 2010, when Sven Kramer was heading for the golden medal in the 
10 km distance speed-skating. At some point, just before a lane change, he 
received an instruction from his coach to go to the inner lane. In that split 
second, Kramer started to doubt his memory and made the wrong decision: 
he stayed in the same lane wrongly. If he had trusted his own memory, 
rather than that of his coach, then he would definitely have won the gold 
medal. Instead, Kramer was disqualified. This example shows that memory 
distrust, even amongst professionals, can have serious consequences. In this 
case, Kramer lost a gold medal. Of course, memory distrust may have even 
more serious consequences when legal matters are involved. This is demon-
strated in case vignettes 1 and 2. 
Case Vignette 1  
On June 7, 1972, 14-year old Judith Roberts was murdered in Staffordshire, 
England. The next day, Andrew Evans left the Army because of medical 
reasons. At that time, he was a 17-year old forgetful young man with low 
self-esteem. Because he had been stationed near the murder scene, Evans 
was asked by the police to complete a witness form a few weeks later. He 
testified that he had been inside the barracks during the whole day and that 
three other soldiers could confirm this. On October 8, two police officers 
interrogated him about some inconsistencies in his testimony. From this 
moment on, Evans started to doubt his memory and developed memory 
distrust (Gudjonsson, 2003). According to the police, Evans behaved very 
nervously. The following night, Evans dreamt about a girl. This distressed 
him and he decided to go to the police station to ask for a photo of the mur-
dered girl to check whether the two images would match. The descriptions 
he gave did not match those of the murdered girl. During subsequent inter-
rogations, Evans behaved agitated. The girl’s face continued to intrude his 
mind. He became convinced that he must have had something to do with 
her murder. Though he provided the police with specific information, he got 
many details wrong. Forty-eight hours after entering the police station, he 
confessed to the murder. The physicians who had examined Evans stated 
that his memories about the murder were poor. According to the doctors, 
this could be explained by psychogenic amnesia. Evans was convicted for 
murder on April 13, 1973. This conviction was mainly based on his confes-
sion. 
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Twenty years after his conviction, Evans had become more and more 
convinced of his innocence. For the Appeal, the psychologist Gisli Gudjons-
son and psychiatrist James MacKeith (Gudjonsson, 2003) examined him and 
concluded that it had been unsafe to rely on Evans’ confession. Further-
more, there were good grounds that he did not suffer from psychogenic am-
nesia. Based on these testimonies, Evans was acquitted on December 3, 1997 
after 25 years imprisonment (Gudjonsson, Kopelman, & MacKeith, 1999). 
Case Vignette 2  
On May 6, 1995, 17-year old Brigitte Tengs was found murdered and sexu-
ally assaulted on Karmoy Island, Norway. Until January 1997, no substantial 
progress had been made in the investigation and the police decided to re-
view all the material once again, before closing the case permanently. As a 
result, Mr A 1,  the cousin of the victim and a highly intelligent man without 
any mental problems, was interrogated again. Two years earlier, he had been 
a suspect, because of reported sexually inappropriate behaviour with girls. 
However, he had denied continuously that he had anything to do with his 
cousin’s murder. He even tracked down a witness who had seen him cycling 
home on the night of the murder, confirming his alibi. Unfortunately, this 
witness timed the cycling differently weakening Mr A’s alibi. About this 
discrepancy in time, the police interrogated him thoroughly using psycho-
logical manipulations in order to break down Mr A’s resistance. Together, 
these interrogations lasted for about 180 hours and seriously undermined his 
confidence in his memory. Moreover, he was isolated from his girlfriend and 
family. At last he confessed, despite having no memories of the crime. None-
theless, he had a strong belief that he had killed his cousin. In detention, a 
few months later, he told his clinical psychologist that he had felt isolated 
and pressured to confess while being interrogated by the police. In addition, 
he became increasingly convinced that he had not killed his cousin. A poly-
graph test indicated that his denial of the murder was truthful. In spite of all 
that, he was convicted for rape and murder in November 1997 and sen-
tenced to 14 years imprisonment. 
During the appeal in 1998 Gudjonsson testified as a court appointed ex-
pert stating that “there was considerable evidence that at the time of making 
the confession [… ] , and for several months afterwards, Mr A was suffering 
from a memory distrust syndrome and had a grossly impaired capacity to 
                                                   
1 The Norwegian Law specifies that the suspect’s real name should not be disclosed in the public 
domain; therefore he is referred to as Mr A. 
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distinguish facts from fantasy” (Gudjonsson, 2003, pp. 605-606). Gudjons-
son was convinced that Mr A had made a coerced-internalised false confes-
sion. This time, the jury found Mr A not guilty of the criminal charges and 
he was released from prison. During the re-investigation of the case, Mr A 
was exonerated by DNA evidence and received compensation (Gudjonsson 
& Sigurdsson, 2010). 
 
Both cases were described in detail by Gisli Gudjonsson (Gudjonsson, 2003; 
Gudjonsson et al., 1999; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2010).2 These are not 
isolated cases. Similar cases can be found all over the Anglo-Saxon legal 
literature, especially the literature on so-called innocence projects (Doyle, 
2005; Scheck, Neufeld, & Dwyer, 2001). There are also some Dutch legal 
cases. A telling example is the Putten murder case in which a stewardess was 
raped and murdered (Blaauw & Blaauw, 2009). After repeated and lengthy 
interrogations that undermined their memory confidence considerably, the 
two main suspects in this case confessed: ‘Then we must have done it’. As a 
result, they were convicted to ten years imprisonment. In a retrial of the case 
after a review decision they were acquitted, but by then they already spent 
almost seven years in prison (Van Koppen, 2009). In 2009, the real perpetra-
tor, Ronald P, was convicted on the basis of a DNA match. These cases illus-
trate that false confessions may result from false memories or beliefs that 
start with memory distrust. 
Since the 1970s, a vast amount of research has been conducted on the 
origins of false memories. The American memory expert Elizabeth Loftus can 
be regarded as the initiator of this type of research. She showed in a series of 
innovative experiments that it is relatively easy to implant misinformation in 
people’s memories, which they later recall with great confidence (Loftus, 
1997). Since Loftus’ pioneering studies, more and more research has been 
conducted in this field focusing on the different types of false memories. 
Although it is relatively easy to create false recollections, it is still unclear 
why individuals like Andrew Evans and Mr A falsely confessed. According to 
Gudjonsson and his colleagues (1999), a combination of Evans’ initial uncer-
tainty, repeated interrogations, and the use of ‘truth serum’, had created a 
state of cognitive chaos and disorientation. This resulted in total uncertainty 
about what was a true memory and what he had been told by or what he 
had inferred from the accounts of others. Memory distrust therefore seems 
to have paved the road for his confession. The same applies to Mr A, who 
                                                   
2 Note that the false confession in Case Vignette 1 (Andrew Evans) was based on a false mem-
ory, whereas that in Case Vignette 2 (Mr A) was based on a false belief. For more information 
about the distinction between false memories and false beliefs, see e.g., Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
Kirsch, & Relyea (2004); Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic (2005). 
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was in a confusional state in which his memory confidence was seriously 
undermined by the interviewing officers, which in turn made him more 
prone to develop a false belief. Would Andrew Evans and Mr A also have 
confessed, had they not been psychologically manipulated during the inter-
rogations and had they not had doubts about their original memories? 
This dissertation addresses the phenomenon of memory distrust. Mem-
ory distrust was introduced in the scientific literature by Gudjonsson and 
MacKeith (1982). They defined the memory distrust syndrome as “some 
persons’ tendencies to be persuaded that they might have committed a crime 
because they do not trust their own memory due to previous memory im-
pairment” (p. 265). About 20 years later, Gudjonsson (2003) gave the syn-
drome a broader connotation, namely “a condition where people develop a 
profound distrust of their memory recollections, as a result of which they are 
particularly susceptible to relying on external cues and suggestions” (p. 196). 
This latter definition will be used in this dissertation for memory distrust. 
In the literature, two types of circumstances are described in which the 
memory distrust syndrome may occur (Gudjonsson, 2003). In the first, sus-
pects have no clear memory of what they were doing at the time of the al-
leged offence.3 This may be due to head injury or substance abuse (e.g., ex-
cessive alcohol use). As a result, suspects start to fill in their memory gap and 
come to believe that they must have committed the crime. In the second 
type of circumstances, suspects are completely convinced of their innocence 
at the beginning of the interrogation and later start to distrust their own 
memory due to psychological manipulations exerted by the interrogator. 
Memory distrust may manifest itself in two different ways. Therefore, in 
this dissertation a distinction is made between trait memory distrust and 
state memory distrust. The first type refers to a habitual distrust in one’s own 
memory. This type closely resembles a personality trait and is therefore more 
permanent by nature. The second type of memory distrust refers to a tempo-
rary state in which a person starts to distrust his/her memory due to external 
conditions. This happens, for example, in the two memory distrust evoking 
conditions that were described above. 
Attribution 
Not everybody distrusts their memory. Following their optimistic bias, many 
people (about 30%) actually believe that they have better memory capabili-
ties than others (Crombag, Merckelbach, & Elffers, 2000). However, in pa-
                                                   
3 This may be true for both guilty and innocent suspects.  
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tients visiting memory clinics such bias is usually absent. Much research has 
been conducted on memory performance of the elderly and their memory 
judgments (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds, Van Boxtel, & Jolles, 2000). Au-
thors in this field point out that memory complaints of the elderly that 
emerged during stressful circumstances may last for a considerable period of 
time and are intensified by concern about dementia, excessive attention to 
memory failures, and negative expectations about one’s own memory. Most 
authors use the term subjective forgetfulness to refer to these complaints, 
which comes close to the concept of memory distrust. 
Two factors seem to play a role when considering memory distrust in the 
clinic: age and education (Commissaris, Ponds, & Jolles, 1998). Both elderly 
people and lower educated individuals appear to blame their supposed 
memory complaints on internal causes, such as advanced age, health prob-
lems, and a chronic poor memory. In these cases, there is a strong connec-
tion between memory distrust and an internal attribution style, which re-
sembles – what we would term – trait memory distrust. Young adults and 
higher educated persons, on the other hand, attribute their forgetfulness to 
external factors, such as stress, emotional problems, and lack of mental ef-
fort. These variables are more transient and therefore we refer to this type of 
memory distrust as state memory distrust. 
In general, people are afraid of forgetting information. This fear grows 
exponentially with age; older persons are often worried about their deterio-
rating memory and about developing dementia. There is ground for these 
fears and worries, because the elderly have more difficulty with remember-
ing than young individuals (Commissaris et al., 1998). However, in older 
individuals no direct relationship has been found between subjective mem-
ory complaints and objective memory performance (Ponds et al., 2000). This 
corresponds well with studies in the field of legal psychology that examined 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy of witnesses confronted 
with line-ups. Here, again, the correlation between subjective beliefs and 
objective performance is absent or modest at best (Brewer, 2006; Tomes & 
Katz, 2000). Thus, very confident eyewitnesses may be wrong. But the con-
trary is also true (Odinot & Wolters, 2006), namely that eyewitnesses who 
have doubts about their memory can make correct identifications. 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
Memory distrust as a trait is also a well-studied phenomenon in the clinical 
literature. Specifically, it is one of the main features of Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder (OCD). This disorder is characterised by chronic doubts about one’s 
own memory functioning (Tolin et al., 2001). These doubts are the driving 
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forces behind compulsions. More specifically, the more often a patient 
checks an action (e.g., locking the door), the more familiar he/she becomes 
with this action. However, memories for such routine actions are less lively 
and detailed than other memories and they are therefore, relatively difficult 
to remember. This is a perfect breeding ground for memory distrust, which 
increases the need for checking. In short, repetitive checking causes memory 
distrust, which in turn causes even more checking (Van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003a, 2003b). As with the elderly, this type of memory distrust does not 
necessarily co-occur with objective memory problems. For example, research 
has shown that OCD patients are rather good in reality monitoring tasks 
(McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993; Merckelbach & Wessel, 2000). In other words, 
they can accurately distinguish between memories of actions they have ac-
tually performed and memories of actions they have only imagined. More-
over, several studies show that OCD patients have intact memory in other 
respects as well (Radomsky & Rachman, 2004; Tolin et al., 2001; Van den 
Hout & Kindt, 2004). For instance, OCD patients are better in remembering 
anxiety related information compared to patients who suffer from other 
anxiety disorders and healthy individuals. Nonetheless, they have more pes-
simistic views about their own memory than the other two groups. 
M etamemory 
This brings us to metamemory, which can be defined as beliefs that indi-
viduals have about the functioning and quality of their memory (Van Oor-
souw, 2004). Memory distrust is evidently a component of metamemory, 
but the relation between metamemory and actual memory deficits is a rather 
complex one. When persons develop a strong metamemory for a particular 
event (which manifests itself in greater confidence, clarity, and more de-
tails), it is fairly simple to explore whether they have accurate memories for 
that specific event. Everyday psychology seems to dictate that people per-
fectly know whether or not they remember an event. However, if a person 
suffers from poor metamemory (low confidence, vagueness, or few details), 
he or she may have a difficult time to decide whether his or her memory is 
accurate. Doubt and insecurity can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
wherein a person will make less effort to recall a memory. For example, 
OCD patients might be able to remember an action, but do not know that 
they do, and therefore do not try to remember the memory anyway (Ra-
domsky & Rachman, 2004). 
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Source M onitoring Errors 
Following the most recent definition, individuals who distrust their own 
memory are more likely to depend on suggestions or cues by others (Gud-
jonsson, 2003). This may lead to source monitoring errors, which occur 
when memories are attributed to the wrong source (e.g., a fantasy is taken 
as a genuine memory). Three different types of source monitoring exist 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993): Reality monitoring refers to distin-
guishing internally generated from externally derived information (Johnson 
& Raye, 1981); external source monitoring pertains to discriminating be-
tween statements from two external sources; and internal source monitoring 
refers to internal discriminations, for example distinguishing between things 
said and thought. 
Source monitoring errors can be elicited by many factors, for example, 
time pressure, high levels of stress, depression, distraction, alcohol and drug 
use, or brain damage (Johnson et al., 1993). Individuals who distrust their 
memory may also suffer from source monitoring errors. Examples are OCD 
patients who cannot remember whether they only thought about turning off 
the gas stove or actually performed this action, or suspects who have trouble 
distinguishing between information they heard from the police and their 
own memories of a crime. Reality monitoring problems were also evident in 
the cases of Andrew Evans and Mr A, who had great difficulty in distin-
guishing facts from fantasy (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Although it is thought that mostly persons who are insecure about their 
memories are more susceptible to suggestions by others, Hekkanen and 
McEvoy (2002) provide an alternative perspective on this issue. They claim 
that individuals who have an optimistic attitude about their own memory 
use less stringent criteria and are, as a result, more susceptible to pseudo-
memories. This would entail that individuals who distrust their memories 
are more critical towards new information and therefore set higher demands 
before they accept it as accurate information. As a result, memory distrust 
may immunise against the acceptance of suggestive information given by 
others. Apparently, the relation between memory distrust and susceptibility 
to suggestions (and source monitoring errors) is not clear-cut (see e.g., 
Liebman et al., 2002; Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998). 
Forensic Practice 
Manoeuvring suspects or eyewitnesses in a certain situation can undermine 
their metamemory and can increase the chance of making source monitor-
ing errors. When this happens during suspect interrogations involving dubi-
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ous interrogation techniques, this may lead to false confessions (Van Bergen, 
2009b). False confessions can be defined as “an admission (‘I did it’) plus a 
post-admission narrative (a detailed description of how and why the crime 
occurred) of a crime that the confessor did not commit” (Leo, 2009, p. 333). 
Though false confessions seem counter-intuitive to most individuals, they 
are not uncommon. In 15 to 25 percent of the DNA exoneration cases, false 
confessions were the main cause of the wrongful conviction (Kassin et al., 
2010; Leo, 2009; Saks & Koehler, 2005; The Innocence Project, 2010). Note 
that there are probably more miscarriages of justice caused by false confes-
sions than these exoneration cases. However, it is unknown how large these 
numbers are. 
Kassin (2008; see also Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985) proposed a taxon-
omy of three types of false confessions: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and 
coerced-internalised false confessions. Most voluntary false confessions are 
given to protect somebody else, to attract media attention, to expiate feelings 
of guilt, or due to confusing facts with fantasy (a common feature of major 
psychiatric illness). In any case, they are made without any pressure from 
the police. Conversely, coerced-compliant and coerced-internalised false 
confessions are made by individuals due to police pressure. Coerced-
compliant false confessions are given for instrumental gain; they are made 
for tactical reasons that have to do with suspects wanting to escape from a 
stressful and unbearable situation in the short term, and assuming that inno-
cence will be proven in the long term. Coerced-internalised false confessions 
are given when suspects come to believe that they have committed the 
crime they are accused of. 
Although the typology of Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) has proven to 
be useful in forensic practice and research, critiques and suggestions for re-
finements have also been given (Gudjonsson, 2003; McCann, 1998; Ofshe & 
Leo, 1997). One of these, the proposed modified framework by Gudjonsson 
(2003), needs to be mentioned briefly (see also Table 1.1). Germane to this 
refinement is that the word coerced is changed into pressured when there is 
clear evidence of coercion. In all other cases, this term should be omitted. 
Furthermore, this framework also classifies the source of the pressure ex-
perienced by the individual, namely a distinction between custodial, non-
custodial, and internal pressure. Altogether this contributes to a bivariate 
classification system, which is summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 
Proposed Framework for Classifying False Confessions (Gudjonsson, 2003) 
Type of false confession Source of pressure 
1. Voluntary Internal 
2. Pressured-compliant Custodial /  Non-custodial 
3. Pressured-internalised Custodial /  Non-custodial 
 
What characteristics contribute to false confessions? Until now, research 
investigating the predictive value of traditional personality characteristics 
(e.g., neuroticism) has yielded equivocal results (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, 
& Josephs, 2003; Israëls & Horselenberg, 2010). However, studies have 
shown that individuals who are highly suggestible and compliant (e.g., juve-
niles, mentally ill or developmentally disabled persons) might be more prone 
to falsely confess (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Nonetheless, it should be 
noted that most of the police-induced confessions are made by mentally 
normal persons (Leo, 2009). In one study, this figure was even higher than 
70% (Drizin & Leo, 2004). Thus, not only personality factors render us vul-
nerable to falsely confess, but also situational factors. One of the main situ-
ational factors is a lengthy and psychologically coercive interrogation (Kas-
sin, 2005; Leo, 2009). The aim of such an interrogation is to undermine the 
suspect’s confidence causing him/her to doubt his/her memory which facili-
tates confession. Research on memory distrust may put a different light on 
this issue and might turn out to be a relevant antecedent of false confessions 
(Gudjonsson, 2003; Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1982). The close relationship 
between memory distrust and false confessions has already been suggested 
by forensic cases such as the two case vignettes described above (Gudjons-
son, 2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2010). The 
figure below (Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2010, p. 101) gives a schematic 
summary of variables that played a role in case vignette 2. It clearly illus-
trates the prominent role of memory distrust. 
M emory Distrust in the Lab 
Besides case studies, there is also some evidence from experimental research 
showing a relationship between memory distrust and false confessions 
(Duijf, 2005; Gudjonsson, Young, & Bramham, 2007). A case in point is a 
study in which guilty students (n = 40) were instructed to steal money from 
a wallet (and keep it), while innocent students (n = 40) were instructed to  
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Figure 1.1. Graphic representation of the false confession of Mr A. This fig-
ure is adopted from Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2010, p. 101).  
* Mr A’s sexually inappropriate behaviour that was reported in the past. 
collect the money and give it back to the experimenter (Duijf, 2005). Both 
groups were interrogated in ways that may induce memory distrust, such as 
providing false evidence (‘There was a camera in the room, so if you stole 
the wallet, we will find out soon’), maximising the crime (‘The person 
whose wallet you stole is very poor and is now in deep trouble since the 
money in the wallet you stole was about the last he had’), suggesting mem-
ory problems (‘I think that you have a poor memory but are not aware of 
that. Therefore you are not responsible for what you have done’), incrimi-
nating evidence (‘Your fingerprints have been found on the stolen wallet’), 
and showing absolute certainty (‘You have stolen a large amount of money 
from someone else’s wallet; I know that for sure. There is no doubt about 
this and by denying it, you are only showing us that you are a liar’). After 
each intervention, students had to indicate on a 10-point Likert scale their 
tendency to confess to the crime (anchors: 1 = ‘totally not willing to confess’; 
10 = ‘totally willing to confess’). The effect of the interventions on the will-
ingness to confess differed per group. The results show why such interven-
tions are popular among police officers: they increase the readiness of guilty 
students to confess (see Figure 1.2). This study, however, also shows that 
Custody and 
Interrogation
Motivation
Prove his innocence
Assist the police
Vulnerability Factors
Lack of memory confidence Good imaginationIndecent exposure*
Pressure
Long duration
Social isolation
Manipulation
Memory
 
Distrust Syndrome
False Confession
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innocents start to doubt their innocence. This finding underscores the danger 
of these interventions: they may lead to false confessions. 
 
Figure 1.2. Tendency to confess (scale 0–10) for the guilty and innocent stu-
dent group separately per intervention (i.e., 1 = false evidence, 2 = maximis-
ing, 3 = suggesting memory problems, 4 = incriminating evidence, 5 = abso-
lute certainty). 
Some false confessions can be seen as special types of pseudo-memories 
(Horselenberg et al., 2003). This is the case with coerced-internalised false 
confessions (i.e., false confessions in which persons believe that they have 
committed the crime). The scenario, on which this type of false confessions 
is based, typically consists of a suspect who has doubts about his/her mem-
ory making him/her more susceptible to suggestions offered by others (e.g., 
police officers). Thus, it appears that memory distrust is closely related to the 
phenomenon of suggestibility. The standard instrument to measure suggesti-
bility is the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997; see for 
the Dutch version: Merckelbach, Muris, Wessel, & Van Koppen, 1998; 
Smeets, 2008). This is a structured procedure in which a short story is read 
out loud to participants. Subsequently, 20 questions are asked, of which 15 
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are misleading questions. Then, participants receive negative feedback (‘You 
did not do very well’) and are asked to answer the questions again. One of 
the GSS parameters – the Shift score – indicates the extent to which indi-
viduals change their answers as a result of negative feedback. According to 
Gudjonsson (2003), this parameter can be conceptualised as an estimate of 
the degree of memory distrust. 
The crucial factor in memory distrust is that giving false feedback makes 
people feel insecure. Evidence for this comes from research that showed a 
strong relationship between the extent to which persons were negative 
about their memory (indexed by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; CFQ; 
Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) and their susceptibility to 
misleading information as indexed by the GSS (Merckelbach et al., 1998). 
The type of memory distrust that is tapped by the GSS has both a state and 
trait component. The former is induced by the negative feedback, whereas 
the latter refers to memory distrust that might have already been present in 
an individual regardless of the feedback. In the forensic setting, the combina-
tion of trait and state memory distrust is also typically found. An example is 
that of a key witness who awoke from a coma, was subsequently interro-
gated in a suggestive way by the police, and finally gave a supposedly false 
incriminatory testimony about the suspect (Merckelbach & Jelicic, 2005). In 
this case, the trait component relates to the cognitive restraints of the wit-
ness that made it impossible to reconstruct the facts of the crime. And ex-
actly in this situation, suggestive manoeuvres – producing the state compo-
nent of memory distrust – may result in pseudo-memories. See for a similar 
case, the analysis of the Schiphol fire (Wagenaar, 2010). 
Besides providing false feedback such as in the GSS, other manipulations 
can also elicit memory distrust. Winkielman and colleagues (1998) devel-
oped a method to manipulate the confidence people have about their mem-
ory capabilities. In their original study, participants had to recall either 4 or 
12 childhood memories. Subsequently, they were asked whether they had 
forgotten large parts of their childhood. One would expect that participants 
who were able to recall many childhood memories would answer this nega-
tively, because the task should have made them feel more confident about 
their autobiographical memory. However, the opposite was true; participants 
gave a more negative memory judgment after completing a difficult task 
(i.e., retrieving 12 memories) than after an easy task (i.e., retrieving 4 
memories). This finding has been replicated in several studies (Merckelbach, 
Wiers, Horselenberg, & Wessel, 2001; Van Oorsouw, 2006). 
This is a paradoxical phenomenon because participants, who had to 
complete the difficult task, most of the times recalled more than 4 memories 
and therefore performed better than participants who were given an easy 
task. This finding suggests that individuals base their memory confidence on 
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the degree of effort (i.e., more effort, less confidence) and not on the supe-
rior performance that results from a lot of effort (i.e., more effort, more con-
fidence). This can be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1973): participants blame the difficulty of the task on the poor state 
of their memory. This phenomenon has practical implications. Imagine, for 
instance, a therapy session in which a patient has to recall many childhood 
memories, followed by questions like ‘what was your childhood like?’, ‘how 
did your parents react?’, leading to a negative judgment about the patient’s 
autobiographical memory, and in some cases, a feeling of having amnesia for 
the past. 
When going through a procedure like that described by Winkielman and 
colleagues (1998), individuals can easily be made insecure about their child-
hood memories. This could elicit state memory distrust. It should be noted, 
though, that this type of distrust focuses on a specific memory aspect, 
namely childhood memories. But does this make individuals also more sus-
ceptible to suggestive manipulations, such as imagination inflation? Based 
on previous research (for an overview see Garry & Polaschek, 2000), one 
would expect a strong relationship between memory distrust and susceptibil-
ity to develop false memories, but more recent research has shown that this 
link is not that straightforward. In two lab studies (Franssens & Peters, 2004; 
Van Bergen & Jelicic, 2007), the Winkielman procedure, or an equivalent 
procedure, was followed by an imagination inflation session (Garry, Man-
ning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). During this session, students were in-
structed to imagine about implausible childhood events. Before and after the 
session, they were asked to indicate how confident they were that those and 
other events had taken place before their 10th birthday. The prediction was 
that the students, who were instructed to recall more events or who ob-
tained negative feedback (that would make them less confident), would rate 
unlikely events they had imagined as more plausible than students who had 
recalled fewer events. This was, however, not found. An explanation for the 
absence of such effect might be that state memory distrust as induced by the 
Winkielman procedure in intelligent, healthy participants is not strong 
enough to make them more susceptible to suggestive manipulations. Further 
research is needed to test this proposition. 
Concluding Remarks 
Memory distrust seems to manifest itself both within clinical and forensic 
settings. To accumulate solid knowledge about the issue of memory distrust, 
proper scales and questionnaires should be developed. When studying state 
memory distrust, existent methods such as the Winkielman procedure have 
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not turned out to be successful. This can be explained to a great extent by 
the weakness of the manipulation. Providing negative feedback may be a 
better way to elicit state memory distrust. According to Gudjonsson (2003), 
the Shift score of the GSS – which indicates the extent to which persons are 
influenced by negative feedback – is a good parameter of state memory dis-
trust. Furthermore, questionnaires may help inform researchers about trait 
memory distrust. The CFQ gives, for instance, an indication of subjective 
memory deficits during daily routines. It seems logical to assume that indi-
viduals who distrust their memory also report more cognitive failures on this 
questionnaire. The CFQ, however, also taps other aspects of subjective cog-
nitive functioning, such as perception and attention. The Squire Subjective 
Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979) might be a 
better instrument to measure memory distrust because it focuses on the 
global judgments people have about their own memory. It is anticipated that 
individuals who distrust their memory generally have a low score on this 
questionnaire. Both the CFQ and SSMQ measure trait-like characteristics, 
which make it possible to map potential relationships between memory dis-
trust and other individual differences. 
The literature on memory distrust is very scattered and the concept is 
not well-developed and under-researched. However, when proper scales and 
questionnaires are developed and tested, they can be used to examine 
whether individuals actually suffer from memory distrust. Next, and more 
interestingly, the consequences of memory distrust can be experimentally 
studied and interventions can be tested that possibly diminish the probability 
of false confessions. 
Outline of this Thesis 
The central aim of this thesis is to systemically explore memory distrust in 
the legal domain. Its focus is on the issue whether memory distrust is an 
antecedent of pseudo-memories and false confessions. To explore this issue 
the following specific questions will be examined first: What is memory dis-
trust? What are related concepts of memory distrust? How can memory dis-
trust be measured best? Are individuals suffering from trait memory distrust 
susceptible to developing false memories, or false confessions? These ques-
tions will all be addressed in the chapters that follow. Apart from a General 
Introduction (Chapter 1) and a General Discussion (Chapter 7), this thesis is 
divided into two parts. 
Part 1 focuses on trait memory distrust and consists of three chapters. 
Chapter 2 describes a validation study of a questionnaire that measures trait 
memory distrust, the SSMQ (Squire et al., 1979). In this chapter, the psy-
CHAPTER 1 
22 
chometric properties of the Dutch version of the SSMQ will be explored and 
discussed. Chapter 3 aims to explore the underlying concepts of memory 
distrust. More specifically, it examines memory distrust, as indexed by the 
SSMQ, and how it relates to concepts such as suggestibility, compliance, false 
memories, and objective memory performance. Chapter 4 continues to focus 
on the relationship between memory distrust, suggestibility, and false 
memories by using a more ecologically valid design, the misinformation 
paradigm. This chapter examines whether persons suffering from memory 
distrust accept misinformation more easily than individuals who are confi-
dent in their memory. 
Part 2 focuses on state memory distrust that might be experienced in the 
interrogation room and consists of two chapters. Chapter 5 examines 
whether the tendency to distrust memory is related to the tendency to 
falsely confess, by using different interrogation techniques. Chapter 6 elabo-
rates on the preceding chapter by examining the causal relationship between 
memory distrust and false confessions. In the study that is described in this 
chapter, memory distrust was elicited by providing negative feedback. 
The thesis concludes with a General Discussion (Chapter 7) that gives an 
overview of the results presented in the preceding chapters. It also addresses 
how these findings can be useful for clinical and forensic practice and sug-
gests some directions for future research. 
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Abstract 
When people suffer from memory distrust, they evaluate their memory in 
negative terms. Memory distrust plays an important role in police interroga-
tions because it may underlie false confessions. The Squire Subjective Mem-
ory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Squire, Wetzel, & Slater, 1979) intends to be a 
simple measure of subjective memory functioning. To our knowledge, no 
data have been published about the psychometric properties of the SSMQ. 
Relying on five samples (ns = 70–819) of healthy individuals and patients, 
we studied the psychometric characteristics of the SSMQ. Principal compo-
nent analysis showed that the SSMQ has a one-dimensional structure refer-
ring to subjective memory evaluation. The SSMQ was found to have ade-
quate reliability and good construct validity. Furthermore, it appears to cor-
relate in a theoretically meaningful way with age and cognitive failures. All 
together, the SSMQ is a psychometrically sound screening tool that can be 
helpful in assessing subjective memory evaluations in the legal domain. In 
this way, vulnerable suspects can be identified in an early stage. 
Introduction 
Distrusting one’s own memory may have far-reaching consequences. A case 
in point is when defendants begin to question their own memory capabilities 
(i.e., distrust their memory) during lengthy police interrogations. As a result, 
they may become more susceptible to misleading information suggested by 
police officers (Gudjonsson, 2003). This, in turn, may lead to false confes-
sions (Gudjonsson et al., 1999). The type of memory distrust that is evoked 
by social pressure and that can be found in some forensic case vignettes is a 
state phenomenon. However, memory distrust can also manifest itself in 
another form, namely that of a personality trait (Van Bergen, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2009). This type of memory distrust, which we refer to as trait 
memory distrust, may be present in defendants before they enter the inter-
rogation room. A combination of trait memory distrust and interrogative 
pressure may increase the psychological vulnerability of the defendant tre-
mendously. Whereas state memory distrust is impossible to evaluate before 
the interrogation takes place, this is not the case for trait memory distrust. 
The latter can, in principle, be quantified with self-report scales designed to 
measure beliefs about one’s own memory capabilities, with negative mem-
ory evaluations corresponding to high levels of memory distrust. 
There are many tests that can be used to assess a person’s objective 
memory performance, but the number of instruments designed to measure 
subjective memory evaluations is limited. Some clinicians use the Cognitive 
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Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982) for this purpose. This 
questionnaire is a simple, but relatively broad measure of metacognition, 
because it not only includes subjective memory items, but also items that 
pertain to perceptual and attentional errors. Other questionnaires that may 
be relevant focus on multiple aspects of metamemory. Examples are the 
Metamemory in Adulthood Questionnaire (MIA; Dixon & Hultsch, 1983) 
and the Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; 
Smith, Della Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000). One limitation of the MIA is that 
it consists of a large number of items (i.e., 108 items), making it less suitable 
for forensic settings in which there is often not much time to evaluate a de-
fendant’s vulnerability. Furthermore, this questionnaire consists of several 
subscales, some of which bear little relevance to subjective memory beliefs of 
defendants. The PRMQ, on the other hand, is short. Half of this scale, how-
ever, addresses prospective memory, i.e., events that may happen in the 
future (Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, & Logie, 2003). As beliefs about 
prospective memory are not helpful for establishing defendants’ vulnerabil-
ity in interrogation settings, this scale seems to be a less promising tool for 
evaluating memory distrust in the legal arena. 
A self-report instrument that measures subjective memory complaints 
and does not suffer from the limitations mentioned above, is the Squire Sub-
jective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Squire et al., 1979). Originally, this 
18-item questionnaire was developed to differentiate memory complaints 
related to depression before electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) from memory 
complaints associated with amnesia after ECT. Yet, Squire and co-workers 
suggested that this questionnaire might also be useful in other settings, in 
which subjective memory functioning is relevant. Because the psychometric 
properties of the original SSMQ have not been examined before, the present 
study sought to evaluate them in healthy adults and patients.  
To test the dimensionality of the questionnaire, principal component 
analysis was conducted. Furthermore, we investigated the reliability of the 
SSMQ by studying its test-retest stability and internal consistency. We also 
examined its construct validity by comparing the SSMQ scores of healthy 
people to those of clinical patients with cognitive complaints. Finally, we 
explored the links (i.e., convergent validity) between the SSMQ and scales 
that measure concepts related to trait memory distrust in the legal context. 
To begin with, we explored to what extent the SSMQ is related to the CFQ 
(Broadbent et al., 1982). As the CFQ taps subjective reports of one’s own 
cognitive functioning, we hypothesised that both measures would overlap to 
a considerable extent. The CFQ was chosen as a measure of concurrent va-
lidity because it is a brief scale of which the Dutch psychometric properties 
have been well researched (Merckelbach & Muris, 2008; Merckelbach, 
Muris, Nijman, & De Jong, 1996). Like the SSMQ, it focuses on retrospective 
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functioning. As well, it is widely used in the Netherlands, both in clinical and 
research domains. Second, we examined how trait memory distrust is re-
lated to compliance as indexed by the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; 
Gudjonsson, 1989). Based on case reports by Gudjonsson (2003) indicating 
that people suffering from memory distrust rely more on external cues and 
suggestions, we expected that these people would also be more compliant 
than others. Third, we studied the association between subjective memory 
complaints and depressive symptoms as measured with Beck’s Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck & Steer, 1996). Given that depressive symptoms are 
often accompanied by pessimistic beliefs, we hypothesised that the SSMQ 
and the BDI-II would be related. Fourth, we examined the relationship be-
tween memory distrust and objective memory functioning as indexed by the 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT; Rey, 1964). Note that studies about 
the relationship between subjective memory complaints and objective mem-
ory performance have come up with mixed findings. Some studies (e.g., 
Brewin & Stokou, 2002) found that these two variables are related, such that 
there is a fundamental integrity to subjective memory beliefs. Other studies, 
however, reported that particularly in older adults, subjective memory com-
plaints may be completely unrelated to intact memory performance (e.g., 
Ponds et al., 2000). 
M ethods 
Participants 
The SSMQ and several other measures were administered to the following 
Dutch samples. Note that all samples were independent. 
Sample 1 consisted of 819 undergraduate students of Maastricht Univer-
sity (594 women; M  = 19.6; SD = 2.2; range = 16–39). These students com-
pleted the SSMQ during a mass screening session at the beginning of the first 
year of their psychology study. 
Sample 2 was a community sample of 70 adults (51 women; M  = 32.5; 
SD = 8.6; range = 17–54). These participants were recruited through adver-
tisements in local newspapers. In these advertisements, we invited people to 
come to our lab when they believed their memory to be either poor or ex-
cellent. This resulted in a ‘poor memory group’ consisting of 33 participants 
(25 women; M  = 33.2; SD = 9.5; range = 17–44) and an ‘excellent memory 
group’ comprising 37 participants (26 women; M  = 31.8; SD = 7.8; range = 
19–45). The two groups did not differ significantly in age [ t(68) < 1, ns]  or 
gender [χ²(1) = .27, ns] . 
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Sample 3 comprised a community sample of 128 adults (95 women; M  = 
33.6; SD = 8.4; range = 16–45). The participants of this sample completed a 
web-based format of the SSMQ via the Internet. A selection of this web 
sample (n = 70) was invited to participate in a follow-up study in which 
several other tests were administered. 
Sample 4 was a community sample of 79 adults (53 women; M = 33.6; 
SD = 9.5; range = 18–49). As was the case for sample 2, this sample was 
recruited through advertisements in various newspapers. However, the ad-
vertisements for sample 4 contained a slightly different formulation than 
those for sample 2; this time we invited people who distrusted their memory 
and people who were very confident in their memory capabilities to partici-
pate in our study.4 This resulted in two groups: a ‘memory distrust group’ (n 
= 40; 27 women; M  = 38.6; SD = 7.9; range = 19–49) and a ‘memory confi-
dence group’ (n = 39; 26 women; M  = 28.5; SD = 8.4; range = 18–46). The 
memory distrust group was older than the memory confidence group [ t(77) 
= 5.48, p < .05] , but the two groups did not differ in their gender distribution 
[χ²(1) = .01, ns] . 
Sample 5 consisted of 75 outpatients from the Neuropsychology Unit of 
Zuwe Hofpoort Hospital/Regional Psychiatric Centre Woerden (41 women; 
M  = 56.6; SD = 15.5; range = 14–82). The majority of these patients was 
referred by neurologists because of memory-related complaints (e.g., amne-
sia, forgetfulness), mild cognitive impairments, cerebrovascular accidents, or 
dementia and most of them also reported mood and/or anxiety symptoms. 
Instruments 
SSMQ 
The SSMQ intends to measure subjective memory functioning. The original 
version consists of 18 items that are rated on a 9-point Likert scale, with 
answer options ranging from ‘worse than ever before’ (-4) to ‘better than 
ever before’ (+4). The large majority of these items refer to retrospective 
memory and the current situation. Examples of items are shown in Table 
2.1. A total score can be obtained by summing SSMQ scores across items. 
Accordingly, the SSMQ total score ranges from -72 to +72, with negative 
scores indicating memory distrust. 
The original SSMQ was linked to the context of ECT and depressive dis-
order. It was designed such that it can be administered during two or three 
test sessions, more specifically, before and after ECT. However, in many 
                                                   
4 This sample was not collapsed with sample 2, as the wording used in the advertisements may 
have attracted different research participants. 
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other domains, there is no need for repeated testing. For example, forensic 
psychologists often only need a rough indication of defendant’s trait memory 
distrust levels before the police start their interrogation. For that reason, a 
single test session will often be sufficient. Therefore, with some slight refor-
mulations of the original SSMQ items, we tried to transform the SSMQ into 
a more general measure of subjective memory functioning. Thus, we 
changed the answer options of the 9-point Likert scale into ‘disastrous’ (-4) 
and ‘perfect’ (+4). Also, pilot work with the Dutch version of the original 
SSMQ showed that participants found the negation embedded in the original 
item 6 confusing. Consequently, we decided to reformulate this item in the 
positive, which also solved the issue of recoding. Table 2.1 gives our adjusted 
version of the SSMQ. A back-translation check made sure that our Dutch 
translation was a perfect equivalent of this version. 
Other tests 
To explore construct and concurrent validity, we administered a series of 
other self-report scales and tasks to our samples. All these measures tap con-
cepts that are related to trait memory distrust in the legal context (e.g., cog-
nitive failures, compliance). Although some traits seem more clinical by na-
ture (e.g., depressive disorder), they often play a role in the legal domain as 
well, for example in cases of vulnerable suspects (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
All samples were administered the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
(CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach et al., 1996). The CFQ comprises 
25 items that pertain to the frequency of everyday failures in memory, at-
tention, and action. Sample items are ‘Do you forget appointments?’ and ‘Do 
you fail to notice signposts on the road?’. Participants have to indicate how 
often they have experienced these errors and slips in the past months on a 
5-point Likert scale (anchors: 0 = ‘never’; 4 = ‘very often’). Scores are 
summed to obtain CFQ total scores, with higher scores reflecting more self-
reported cognitive failures. 
To samples 2, 3, and 4, we also administered the Gudjonsson Compli-
ance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989; Horselenberg et al., 2006) that gives an 
indication of how compliant a person is. This scale consists of 20 items in a 
true-false format. Illustrative items are ‘I give in easily to people when I am 
pressured’ and ‘I try to please others’. After recoding items 17, 18, and 19, 
scores are summed. The higher the GCS total score, the more compliant a 
person is. 
In samples 1 and 5, depressive symptomatology was measured with 
Beck’s Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck & Steer, 1996). This scale con-
sists of 21 items that are scored on a 4-point Likert scale (anchors: 0 = 
‘symptom is not present’; 3 = ‘symptom is severe’). Items refer to typical 
depressive symptoms like gloominess, aversion, and suicidal thoughts. A 
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BDI-II total score can be obtained by summing individual item scores, with 
higher scores reflecting higher levels of depression. 
To measure objective memory performance, the Auditory Verbal Learn-
ing Test (AVLT; Deelman, Brouwer, Van Zomeren, & Saan, 1980; Rey, 1964) 
was administered to samples 2, 3, and 5. The AVLT consists of 15 monosyl-
labic meaningful words that are read out loud by the experimenter on five 
trials. After each trial, participants are instructed to reproduce these words 
(immediate recall). This gives an indication of short term verbal memory. 
Although the task is also designed to measure delayed recall and recognition, 
the present study only addressed immediate recall. 
Results 
Item Analysis 
Inspection of the data showed that there were four outliers in the distribu-
tion of the SSMQ total scores (i.e., deviating more than 3 standard devia-
tions from the mean): three students (sample 1) and one patient of the Neu-
ropsychology Unit (sample 5). Their records were excluded from further 
analyses. The distribution (N = 1167) had a unimodal left-skewed shape. The 
skewness (-.70; SE = .07) and kurtosis (.83; SE = .14) were not within the 
normal range, due to the large proportion of undergraduate students in the 
overall sample, who generally scored high on the SSMQ (i.e., had favourable 
opinions about their memory functioning). Table 2.1 gives the mean scores, 
standard deviation, corrected item-total correlation, and squared multiple 
correlation (i.e., explained variance) per SSMQ item for the total sample (N 
= 1167). As none of the corrected item-total correlations was smaller than 
.3, there was no need to exclude any SSMQ item. Thus, all items tap related 
conceptual domains. Cronbach’s α for the whole set of items was .93. 
Table 2.1 
Mean Scores (M), Standard Deviations (SD), Corrected Item-Total Correla-
tions (r), and Squared Multiple Variance (r2) for each SSMQ Item (N = 
1167). Loadings (L) are given of the One-Dimensional Structure in Commu-
nity and Clinical Samples (Samples 2–5, N = 351) 
Items M SD r r2 L 
My ability to search through my mind and 
recall names or memories I know are there 
is 
0.89 1.76 .71 .50 .82 
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Items M SD R r2 L 
I think my relatives and acquaintances now 
judge my memory to be 
1.35 1.62 .67 .45 .81 
My ability to recall things when I really try is 1.08 1.67 .72 .52 .86 
My ability to hold in my memory things I 
have learned is 
1.31 1.54 .68 .46 .82 
If I were asked about it a month from now, 
my ability to remember facts about this form 
I am filling out would be 
0.31 1.75 .68 .46 .85 
My ability to make a past memory that is on 
‘the tip of my tongue’ available is 
0.19 1.63 .48 .23 .74 
My ability to recall things that happened a 
long time ago is 
0.93 1.69 .62 .38 .70 
My ability to remember the names and faces 
of people I meet is 
0.85 1.88 .58 .34 .74 
My ability to remember what I was doing 
after I have taken my mind off it for a few 
minutes is 
0.88 1.61 .66 .44 .82 
My ability to remember things that have 
happened more than a year ago is 
0.91 1.66 .74 .55 .82 
My ability now to remember what I read 
and what I watch on television is 
1.05 1.60 .69 .48 .84 
My ability to recall things that happened 
during my childhood is 
0.57 1.92 .50 .25 .60 
My ability to know when the things I am 
paying attention to are going to stick in my 
memory is 
0.93 1.44 .62 .38 .77 
My ability to make sense out of what people 
explain to me is 
1.62 1.42 .58 .34 .69 
My ability to reach back in my memory and 
recall what happened a few minutes ago is 
1.38 1.56 .66 .44 .81 
My ability to pay attention to what goes on 
around me is 
1.52 1.43 .61 .37 .76 
My general alertness to things happening 
around me is 
1.48 1.48 .55 .30 .68 
My ability to follow what people are saying 
is 
1.56 1.39 .58 .34 .74 
Note. Only loadings higher than .4 were considered in our analysis (Stevens, 1992). 
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Principal Component Analysis 
To explore the dimensions underlying the SSMQ, we performed principal 
component analysis on SSMQ scores of samples 2 through 5 (n = 351; see 
Table 2.1 for factor loadings). We did not include sample 1, because this 
large sample consisted of undergraduate students who generally have a fa-
vourable opinion of their own memory. Including this sample would have 
biased the dimensional structure. The point here is that our community and 
clinical samples are more representative of the defendants generally interro-
gated by the police. Visual inspection of the scree plot (see Figure 2.1) sug-
gested one general dimension. This dimension had an eigenvalue of 10.77, 
explaining 59.8% of the total variance, and included all 18 SSMQ items. We 
labelled this dimension ‘subjective memory evaluation’. 
 
Figure 2.1. Scree-plot of eigenvalues obtained from principal component 
analysis of 18 SSMQ items. 
Reliability 
Test-retest stability was measured (in terms of Pearson product-moment r) 
by administering the SSMQ twice to two samples. More than half of sample 
2 (n = 38) completed the SSMQ for a second time and returned it by mail, 
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approximately three months after the first test session. A test-retest stability 
of .87 was found. In sample 3, participants were asked to complete the 
SSMQ on the Internet. A subgroup of this sample (n = 70) was selected for a 
follow-up study, in which the SSMQ was given for a second time. This time, 
a test-retest stability of .90 was found, with an interval of approximately six 
weeks between both test sessions. 
Furthermore, as can be seen in Table 2.2, internal consistency (in terms 
of Cronbach’s α) was excellent and varied from .88 to .96 per sample. 
Validity 
Construct validity 
Because the five samples were quite heterogeneous by nature, we expected 
that they would differ with respect to SSMQ total scores. Indeed, an one-
way Analysis of Variance showed a significant group difference [F(4,1162) = 
41.81, p < .001]. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses revealed that the 
undergraduate sample (sample 1) had the highest SSMQ scores and in this 
way differed significantly from all other samples (all ps < .01). Furthermore, 
the community samples (samples 2, 3, and 4) had significantly higher SSMQ 
scores (all ps < .001) than the clinical sample (sample 5). Thus, undergradu-
ate students were, not surprisingly, most optimistic about their own mem-
ory, followed by people from the community, followed by outpatients. Table 
2.2 gives an overview of the mean SSMQ total scores per sample. 
Table 2.2 
Sample Size (n), Mean Total Score (M), Standard Deviation (SD), Range, 
and Internal Consistency (Cronbach’s α) of the SSMQ, for each Sample 
Samples n M SD Range α 
1 – Undergraduate students 816 22.59 14.79 -18 – 64 .88 
2 – Community sample 70 14.36 22.13 -30 – 57 .94 
3 – Community sample  128 13.88 23.67 -46 – 59 .96 
4 – Community sample 79 12.80 26.71 -59 – 62 .96 
5 – Patients  74 -3.71 27.24 -64 – 55 .96 
 
As an additional test of construct validity, we compared the two memory 
groups in samples 2 and 4. As one might have expected, SSMS scores corre-
sponded with the general memory beliefs that people had and which formed 
the basis for their assignment to the conditions. Thus, for sample 2, the ex-
cellent memory group had significantly higher scores on the SSMQ than the 
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poor memory group [ t(68) = 10.41, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.49] , means be-
ing 30.62 (SD = 14.03) and -3.88 (SD = 13.62), respectively. This pattern 
was replicated in sample 4. That is, people who were very confident in their 
own memory showed significantly higher SSMQ scores than people report-
ing that they suffered from memory distrust [ t(77) = 11.95, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 2.70] , means being 34.46 (SD = 14.33) and -8.32 (SD = 17.32), 
respectively. Even when age was included as a covariate, group differences 
with regard to SSMQ total scores remained significant (both ps < .001). 
Not surprisingly, when all samples were collapsed, age correlated nega-
tively with SSMQ total scores (r = -.34, p < .001). That is, older adults were 
more pessimistic about their own memory capabilities than young adults. 
Also, men tended to have slightly lower SSMQ scores than women [ t(1161) 
= 1.71, p = .09; two-tailed] , means being 17.24 (SD = 21.61) and 19.41 (SD 
= 18.74), respectively. However, analysis of covariance showed that after 
correcting for age, this borderline gender difference disappeared [F(1,1109) 
= .62, p = .42] . 
Convergent validity 
To assess the concurrent validity of the SSMQ, we correlated SSMQ scores 
with scores on other relevant questionnaires and tests (see Table 2.3).5 In 
some samples, we identified outliers (i.e., deviating more than 3 standard 
deviations from the mean). They were removed and are therefore not in-
cluded in the following analyses. Also, incomplete records were excluded 
from data analysis, which explains the fluctuations in degrees of freedom. 
First, in the community samples (samples 2, 3, and 4), the CFQ corre-
lated substantially but negatively with the SSMQ. In the student group 
(sample 1) and the clinical sample (sample 5), these correlations were 
somewhat lower. They were, however, still in the predicted direction and 
reached significance. Second, the relationship between subjective memory 
complaints and compliance was inconsistent. In sample 3, we found that the 
more negative participants scored on the SSMQ, the more compliant they 
were, but this significant relationship was not replicated in samples 2 and 4. 
Third, with respect to the BDI-II, we found in sample 1 that the more de-
pressed participants were, the lower they scored on the SSMQ. Yet, in sam-
ple 5, this relationship failed to reach significance. Fourth, we found that the 
SSMQ and AVLT were positively correlated in the healthy samples (samples 
                                                   
5 We used Pearson product-moment correlations because with the exception of the student 
sample 1, all samples displayed a normal SSMQ distribution. For sample 1, we also calculated 
the non-parametric correlation statistics Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho. Although these 
statistics differed in a subtle way from the Pearson correlations, the overall levels of significance 
remained basically the same. 
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2 and 3), whereas a non-significant but positive correlation was obtained in 
the clinical sample (sample 5). When samples 2, 3, and 5 were collapsed, we 
found a significant positive correlation between subjective (SSMQ) and ob-
jective (AVLT) memory (n = 182; r = .31; r2 = .09). 
Table 2.3 
Pearson Product-Moment Correlations between SSMQ Total Scores and 
Construct-Related Variables (for each Sample) 
Tests Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 Sample 5 
CFQ -.43 
(n = 494) 
-.72 
(n = 67) 
-.70 
(n = 70) 
-.73 
(n = 77) 
-.60 
(n = 69) 
GCS - -.08 
(n = 69) 
-.33* 
(n = 70) 
-.15 
(n = 75) 
- 
BDI-II -.14* 
(n = 448) 
- - - -.18 
(n = 44) 
AVLT - .31* 
(n = 70) 
.25* 
(n = 70) 
- .19 
(n = 43) 
Note. CFQ = Cognitive Failures Questionnaire; GCS = Gudjonsson Compliance Scale; BDI-II = 
Beck’s Depression Inventory-II; AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test. 
* p < .05. 
Discussion 
All in all, our findings indicate that the SSMQ has solid psychometric proper-
ties. A one-dimensional structure was found that makes conceptual sense. In 
various samples, we found evidence for satisfactory test-retest stability and 
excellent internal consistency. With respect to construct validity, the SSMQ 
distinguished very well between different samples (i.e., students, community 
samples, and outpatients) and different memory groups (e.g., memory dis-
trust vs. memory confidence). Furthermore, the questionnaire appeared to 
correlate in a theoretically meaningful way with age and cognitive failures, 
although the correlational pattern for compliance, depression, and objective 
memory performance was less compelling. 
In line with its name, the SSMQ was found to consist of one dimension 
reflecting beliefs that people have about their memory functioning (i.e., sub-
jective memory). Indeed, inspection of the SSMQ items also makes clear that 
they pertain to subjective memory evaluation. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that we found an overlap between the SSMQ and CFQ in all samples. Note, 
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however, that the CFQ contains heterogeneous items alluding to memory, 
attention, and motor efficiency (Broadbent et al., 1982). 
We found that SSMQ scores differentiate between a priori beliefs that 
people have about their own memory functioning, with scores being higher 
for those who have favourable opinions about their memory than those who 
evaluate it in negative terms. One could counter that this is a weak approach 
to measure construct validity. While it is true that finding a null result would 
have been more diagnostic for the (lack of) construct validity than finding a 
connection between a priori beliefs and SSMQ scores, one should also take 
effect sizes – which were considerable – into account. Meanwhile, beliefs 
that people have about their own cognitive functioning need not to parallel 
their actual memory performance. Thus, subjective memory confidence and 
objective memory functioning were significantly and positively correlated in 
samples 2 and 3 (i.e., community samples), but not in sample 5 (i.e., clinical 
sample). Even in samples 2 and 3, the proportion of explained variance was 
by all standards modest (.06 and .09, respectively). So, the link between 
subjective and objective memory turned out to be fragile, but this is not an 
unusual theme in the literature. Several studies (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds 
et al., 2000) reported similar findings among the elderly. These studies bear 
strong relevance to our results, as the patients in our clinical sample were 
significantly older than the people in our community samples 2 and 3. 
Hence, it seems that young and middle-aged adults are more accurate in 
estimating their own memory functioning than older adults. An explanation 
might be that older people, who experience more cognitive problems in daily 
life, are more often preoccupied with their memory problems and therefore 
overestimate these problems in self-report questionnaires, while in fact their 
objective memory performance is not as poor as they think. Another possi-
bility is that the lack of association between objective memory performance 
and subjective memory complaints in sample 5 was due to health problems 
experienced by the patients in this sample. However, because of the hetero-
geneity of the memory complaints, health problems, and mood and anxiety 
disorders involved, no hard conclusions can be drawn about the effect of 
health problems on subjective memory complaints. 
Two further remarks are in order about the correlates of the SSMQ. We 
expected that compliance would be intimately linked to negative beliefs 
about one’s own memory. This expectation was not fully borne out by the 
data. In general, we found a negative correlation between subjective mem-
ory evaluation and compliance. In other words, the more people distrust 
their memories, the more they comply with others. This is the pattern one 
would expect, because memory distrust almost by definition implies that 
people suffering from it rely on cues or suggestions provided by others. 
However, the memory distrust-compliance link was only evident for the 
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community sample 3. Apparently, the relationship between memory evalua-
tion and compliance is not as straightforward as anticipated. Using other 
samples in future research, such as alleged false confessors or forensic pa-
tients, might shed a different light on this link, because in general, they tend 
to have higher compliance scores. Evidently, this link is most relevant 
among forensic groups, while it might be less obvious in community and 
clinical samples due to, for example, restriction of range phenomena. 
Surprisingly, the predicted relationship between depression and negative 
beliefs about one’s memory was less evident in the clinical sample. Although 
the correlation in this sample failed to reach significance, it was in the pre-
dicted direction, with more depressive symptoms being associated with more 
pessimistic thoughts about one’s own memory, and consistent with mixed 
findings in other studies examining the relationship between depression and 
metamemory beliefs (Kalska, Punamäki, Mäkinen-Pelli, & Saarinen, 1999; 
Ponds & Jolles, 1996) 
In sum, the SSMQ appears to be a reliable and valid instrument measur-
ing subjective beliefs about one’s own memory. Because memory distrust 
can be seen as an antecedent of false confessions (Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 
1982), the SSMQ may be a valuable tool for estimating the vulnerability of 
suspects or eyewitnesses before interrogation. By administering the SSMQ, 
forensic psychologists may obtain an indication of the potential risk of mem-
ory distrust and inform police officers to exercise caution when questioning 
a suspect or eyewitness. In particular, very low scores on the SSMQ might be 
indicative of high vulnerability of trait memory distrust. Meanwhile, the 
precise connection between the SSMQ scores and compliance requires fur-
ther study. Thus, it may well be the case that pessimistic beliefs about one’s 
own memory only go along with compliance to the extent that the person 
has other characteristics that make him or her vulnerable (e.g., depression, 
external locus of control). Besides assisting forensic psychologists in assessing 
the vulnerability of suspects and eyewitnesses, this instrument may also 
facilitate empirical research on the concept of memory distrust. 
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Abstract 
The relationship between subjective memory beliefs and suggestibility, com-
pliance, false memories, and objective memory performance was studied in a 
community sample of young and middle-aged people (N = 142). We hy-
pothesised that people with subjective memory problems would exhibit 
higher suggestibility and compliance levels and would be more susceptible to 
false recollections than those who are optimistic about their memory. In 
addition, we expected a discrepancy between subjective memory judgments 
and objective memory performance. We found that subjective memory 
judgments correlated significantly with compliance, with more negative 
memory judgments accompanying higher levels of compliance. Contrary to 
our expectation, subjective memory problems did not correlate with sug-
gestibility or false recollections. Furthermore, participants were rather accu-
rate in estimating their objective memory performance. 
Introduction 
There are large individual differences in how people evaluate their own 
memory. While most of us tend to be quite optimistic about the power of 
our memory, some people believe their memory is much poorer compared 
to that of people from their own age group (Crombag et al., 2000; Magnus-
sen et al., 2006). However, subjective ideas about memory do not always 
correspond to objective memory performance (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds 
et al., 2000). For example, healthy older people (more than 55 years old) 
who rate their memory as very poor, often exhibit normal performance on 
standard memory tasks (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds et al., 2000). In a foren-
sic setting, pessimistic ideas about one’s own memory might have far-
reaching consequences. Given the weight that triers of fact attach to confi-
dence (Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992), individuals with such pessi-
mistic ideas may erroneously be treated as less credible eyewitnesses or sus-
pects. 
There are hints in the literature suggesting that negative ideas about 
one’s own memory are associated with elevated suggestibility levels and an 
enhanced susceptibility to false recollections. People who judge their own 
memory as very poor because they suffer from the memory distrust syn-
drome, are thought to be especially prone to memory distortions (Gudjons-
son & MacKeith, 1982). According to Gudjonsson (2003, p. 196), memory 
distrust is “a condition where people develop profound distrust of their 
memory recollections, as a result of which they are particularly susceptible 
to relying on external cues and suggestions”. Gudjonsson describes a number 
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of court cases in which defendants suffering from memory distrust, devel-
oped false memories, eventually resulting in false confessions (Gudjonsson, 
2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999). Note that such isolated single cases do not 
provide hard evidence for a close connection between pessimistic opinions 
about one’s own memory and suggestibility. Furthermore, we believe that a 
distinction should be drawn between state and trait memory distrust, with 
the former referring to the cases described in the literature and the latter 
manifesting itself as a personality trait. In this chapter, we will focus on trait 
memory distrust which can be seen as a negative subjective memory judg-
ment. 
Compliance is a concept related to suggestibility. It can be defined as “a 
tendency of the individual to go along with propositions, requests or instruc-
tions, for some immediate instrumental gain” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 370). 
Whereas suggestibility assumes that people accept the information provided, 
this does not apply to compliance. Nonetheless, the consequences of comply-
ing can be far-reaching in some settings. Think for example of complying 
with statements about a murder expressed by a police officer or complying 
with a therapist’s suggestion that you might have been sexually abused. 
Research has shown that people with poor self-esteem are highly compliant 
(Gudjonsson, Hannesdottir, Petursson, & Bjornsson, 2002). As self-esteem 
and judgments about one’s memory seem to be related, a measure of com-
pliance was included in our study. 
To our knowledge, the relationship between judgments of one’s own 
memory on the one hand, and suggestibility, compliance, false recollections, 
and objective memory performance on the other hand has not yet been 
studied systematically. Therefore, we designed a study to examine these 
associations. Following the ideas of Gudjonsson (2003), we hypothesised 
that participants with subjective memory problems would exhibit higher 
levels of suggestibility and compliance and would be more susceptible to 
false recollections than those who reported to have excellent memory capa-
bilities. The idea here is that people who have pessimistic ideas about their 
own memory will be more willing to comply with the suggestive cues given 
by others. Furthermore, based on the work of Crombag et al. (2000), we 
expected that people would overestimate their own memory functioning. 
This hypothesis is consistent with research demonstrating that in healthy 
elderly, subjective evaluations of memory do not appear to be associated 
with objective memory performance (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds et al., 
2000). We decided to select a sample of young and middle-aged participants, 
so as to be sure that the subjective memory judgments we measured were 
not linked to age-related memory problems. 
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M ethod 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 142 young and middle-aged research participants 
(105 women), who were recruited through advertisements in a regional 
newspaper. Their mean age was 34.23 years (SD = 8.06, range = 17–46). The 
participants were told that they would be administered several memory tasks 
and questionnaires. They were given a financial compensation (€25) for 
participating in our study. The research was approved by the standing ethical 
committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht Uni-
versity. 
Instruments 
Subjective memory 
A Dutch translation of the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; 
Squire et al., 1979; Van Bergen, 2008; Van Bergen, Brands, Jelicic, & 
Merckelbach, 2010a; Cronbach’s α = .94) was used to measure subjective 
memory. This self-report questionnaire consists of 18 items, which are an-
swered on a 9-point Likert scale (anchors: -4 = ‘disastrous’; +4 = ‘perfect’). 
Sample items are ‘My ability to recall things when I really try is’ and ‘My 
ability to remember things that have happened more than a year ago is’. 
Scores are summed to obtain an SSMQ total score (varying from -72 to +72), 
with a negative score indicating a negative subjective evaluation of one’s 
own memory. The SSMQ has good test-retest stability (r = .89; n = 113; Van 
Bergen et al., 2010a). 
To test the concurrent validity of the SSMQ, we administered another 
index of subjective memory functioning; the Dutch translation of the Cogni-
tive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach et al., 
1996; Cronbach’s α = .92). The CFQ consists of 25 items that measure self-
reported frequency of everyday lapses and errors in memory, percep-
tion/attention, and action. Illustrative items are ‘Do you forget where you 
put something like a newspaper or a book?’, ‘Do you fail to notice signposts 
on the road?’, and ‘Do you drop things?’. Participants are asked to indicate 
on a 5-point Likert scale how often they have experienced each cognitive 
failure during the past months (anchors: 0 = ‘never’; 4 = ‘very often’). Scores 
are summed to obtain a CFQ total score, with higher scores indicating more 
self-reported cognitive failures. The Dutch translation of the CFQ has ade-
quate psychometric properties (Merckelbach et al., 1996). 
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Suggestibility and compliance 
A Dutch translation of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjons-
son, 1984) was used to measure suggestibility. The GSS consists of a story 
that is read out loud by the experimenter. In the free recall phase, partici-
pants are asked to write down what they can remember from the story. Fifty 
min later, participants are given a second free-recall test. Subsequently, they 
are asked a series of 20 questions. Fifteen of these questions contain mislead-
ing elements in the sense that they suggest things that are not mentioned in 
the story, whereas five other questions are factual memory questions. After 
they have answered the questions, participants receive negative feedback 
irrespective of their performance (i.e., ‘You have made a number of errors. It 
is therefore necessary to go through the questions once more, and this time, 
try to be more accurate’). Next, the questions are repeated. 
The GSS yields several parameters. First, with regard to the free recall, 
the number of correctly reproduced story elements is counted (maximum = 
40). This is done for both immediate and delayed recall. The corresponding 
inter-rater reliability parameters were .95 and .93, respectively (both ps < 
.001). Also, four suggestibility parameters can be derived from the GSS. 
Yield1 refers to the number of misleading elements that the participant ac-
cepts during the first set of questions (maximum = 15). Yield2 reflects the 
number of accepted misleading elements during the second set of questions 
(maximum = 15). Shift refers to the number of answers that the participant 
changes as a result of the negative feedback (maximum = 20). The GSS total 
score is the sum of Yield1 and Shift, with higher scores indicating higher 
suggestibility levels. Research has shown that the Dutch version of the GSS 
is a psychometrically sound instrument (Merckelbach et al., 1998). More 
specifically, Merckelbach et al. reported sufficient internal consistency, with 
Cronbach’s αs being .79 (Yield1), .75 (Shift), and .82 (GSS total score). Test-
retest stability was modest (r = .55). They also found indications for the pre-
dictive validity of the Yield scales. 
The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1997; Cronbach’s 
α = .75) is a self-report measure consisting of 20 items which all tap compli-
ant behaviour, in other words, the tendency to give in to another’s opinion. 
Examples of GCS items are ‘I give in easily when I am pressured’, ‘People in 
authority make me feel uncomfortable and uneasy’, and ‘I try to please oth-
ers’. The items have a true-false format. After recoding, scores are summed 
(range = 0–20), with higher scores reflecting more compliant behaviour. In 
the present study, we employed a Dutch translation of the GCS, which has 
good psychometric properties (Smeets, 2008). 
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False recollections 
To measure individual differences in the tendency to develop false recollec-
tions, we employed the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM) paradigm 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The 10 wordlists that were used comprised 
15 Dutch words each. Each list contained words (e.g., drowsy, bed, dream) 
that were associated with a non-presented theme word (e.g., sleep). This 
word is called the critical lure. Extensive pilot studies by Peters, Jelicic, Haas, 
and Merckelbach (2006) have shown that proportions of recall and recogni-
tion of these wordlists are comparable to those reported by Roediger and 
McDermott. Participants were told that they would hear several wordlists 
and would be tested immediately after hearing each list by writing down all 
the words they could remember. They were instructed not to guess. The lists 
were read out loud by the experimenter at a pace of 1 word per second with 
an inter-stimulus interval of 1 second. After each list, participants were given 
2 min to write down all the words they could remember. Split-half reliability 
was excellent for correctly recalled words (Spearman-Brown coefficient = 
.92) and moderate for the critical lures (Spearman-Brown coefficient = .54). 
After all lists had been presented, a recognition test was given. This test 
consisted of 30 old words and 30 new words. Three items per list corre-
sponding with serial positions 1, 8 and 10, were selected as old words. Ten of 
the new words were critical lures and the other 20 words were derived from 
other wordlists that were not used during this experiment. 
Objective memory performance 
The Dutch version of the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (AVLT; Deelman et 
al., 1980; Rey, 1964) was used to determine objective memory performance. 
This test consists of 15 monosyllabic meaningful words that are presented on 
five successive trials. Participants are asked to recall the words after each trial 
(immediate recall). Delayed recall is measured after an interval of approxi-
mately 15 min during which participants complete non-verbal filler tasks. 
The present study focused on both immediate and delayed recall. Research 
has shown that the AVLT has high internal consistency, with Cronbach’s α 
being .95 (Deelman et al., 1980). Test-retest stability was acceptable, varying 
from .64 (for long intervals) to .85 (for intervals less than 1 hour). 
Recognition was also measured by reading a list of 30 words out loud, 
consisting of 15 old and 15 new words. For each word, participants had to 
indicate whether or not the word had appeared on the study list and true 
positive, false positive, and false negative scores were scored. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory room. Upon arri-
val, they were first asked to give informed consent. Next, the GSS was ad-
ministered, followed by the DRM recall task. After this, participants com-
pleted several questionnaires (including the SSMQ, CFQ, and the GCS) and 
they were given the recognition part of the DRM task. Immediately after this 
task, they were asked to write down the GSS story for a second time. Partici-
pants were asked 20 questions about the story and, after they had been 
given false feedback on their performance, they were instructed to answer 
the 20 questions again. Next, the AVLT was administered. In the time inter-
val between immediate recall and delayed recall followed by recognition, 
participants completed several unrelated filler questionnaires. 
Results 
Table 3.1 shows the mean scores, standard deviations and ranges of the self-
report questionnaires, the GSS, the false memory task (DRM), and the 
AVLT. 
Subjective M emory 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, the SSMQ total scores ranged from -46 to +57. 
This indicates that both people with negative and positive impressions of 
their memory participated in our study. There was a significant negative 
correlation between subjective memory evaluation and cognitive failures (r 
= -.72, p < .05), showing that more optimistic views about one’s own mem-
ory were associated with fewer self-reported cognitive failures. This under-
lines the concurrent validity of the SSMQ. 
Suggestibility and Compliance 
Both immediate and delayed recall on the GSS were positively correlated 
with subjective memory beliefs (both rs = .30, both ps < .05). However, none 
of the correlations between SSMQ and other GSS parameters attained sig-
nificance (see Table 3.2). Furthermore, we found a negative correlation be-
tween the GCS and the SSMQ (r = -.22, p < .05), suggesting that more opti-
mistic opinions about one’s memory are associated with less compliance. 
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Table 3.1 
Mean Scores, Standard Deviations and Ranges of the Questionnaires and 
Tests in a Community Sample (N = 142) 
Instruments M SD Range 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire 11.39 22.55 -46 – 57 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 40.59 14.42 12 – 79 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale 10.40 3.92 2 – 18 
GSS  Immediate recall 16.85 6.01 4.5 – 33 
 Delayed recall 15.80 6.05 3 – 34.5 
 Yield1 3.62 2.61 0 – 12 
 Yield2 4.77 3.29 0 – 13 
 Shift 3.25 2.56 0 – 10 
 GSS total score 6.87 4.40 0 – 20 
DRM  Recall Correct 91.07 16.17 53 – 128 
  False – critical lures 4.97 2.23 0 – 10 
 Recognition  Correct – old words 23.94 3.69 10 – 30 
  False – critical lures 8.35 2.21 1 – 10 
AVLT  Immediate 
recall 
Correct 46.46 11.10 21 – 69 
  Incorrect 1.27 1.97 0 – 10 
 Delayed 
recall 
Correct 9.75 3.41 1 – 15 
  Incorrect 0.37 0.67 0 – 3 
 Recognition  True positive 13.97 1.69 4 – 15 
  False positive 0.27 0.72 0 – 6 
  False negative 1.04 1.69 0 – 11 
False Recollections 
Although the number of correctly recalled words in the DRM task correlated 
significantly to SSMQ scores (r = .36, p < .05), there was no link between 
SSMQ scores and endorsement of critical lures during the free recall phase (r 
= -.04, p = .62). As for the recognition parameters, the SSMQ was only 
partly related to false recollections. More specifically, a significant negative 
correlation was found between old words that were correctly remembered as 
old words and the SSMQ (r = -.19, p < .05). Such a relationship was absent 
for the SSMQ and critical lures that were remembered as old words (r = -.12, 
p = .16). 
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Table 3.2 
Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlations between Subjective Memory (in-
dexed by the SSMQ) and Other Tests in a Community Sample (N = 142) 
Instruments SSMQ 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire -.72* 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale -.22* 
Suggestibility Immediate recall .30* 
 Delayed recall .30* 
 Yield1 .13 
 Yield2 .01 
 Shift .11 
 GSS total score .14 
False recollections  Recall Correct  .36* 
  False – critical lures -.04 
 Recognition  Correct – old words .19* 
  False – critical lures -.12 
Objective memory Immediate recall Correct .29* 
  Incorrect -.12 
 Delayed recall Correct .29* 
  Incorrect .00 
 Recognition  True positive .24* 
  False positive -.09 
  False negative -.25* 
Note. The application of a Bonferroni correction did not change the general pattern.  
* p < .05. 
Objective M emory Functioning 
Table 3.2 shows Pearson’s product-moment correlations of the SSMQ with 
objective memory indices. Subjective memory judgments (indexed by the 
SSMQ) and objective memory functioning (measured by the AVLT) corre-
lated significantly, both for immediate and delayed correct recall (both rs = 
.29, both ps < .05). As for word recognition, the SSMQ correlated signifi-
cantly with true positives (i.e., correct identification of studied words). In 
other words, participants with higher SSMQ scores correctly recognised 
more old words as previously presented (r = .24, p < .05). Similarly, SSMQ 
scores were negatively correlated with false negatives (r = -.25, p < .05). No 
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significant correlation emerged between SSMQ and false positives, that is 
falsely recognising words that were not studied (r = -.09, p = .30). 
Extreme Values 
As correlational analyses assume linearity, and this assumption might not be 
true for our sample, we conducted additional analyses for which we created 
two groups consisting of participants with extreme SSMQ values: a poor 
memory group, with the 25% lowest SSMQ scores (n = 35) and an excellent 
memory group, with the 25% highest SSMQ scores (n = 38). Independent 
samples t-tests revealed a similar pattern as was obtained with Pearson 
product-moment correlations, except for the GCS [Ms being 11.34 (SD = 
3.98) and 10.05 (SD = 3.76), respectively; t(71) = 1.43, p = .16] .  
In other words, we found significant differences between the poor and 
excellent memory group on all objective memory parameters and the ques-
tionnaire tapping cognitive failures (both ps < .05). But no group differences 
on suggestibility, compliance, and false recollection parameters emerged. 
Inter-correlations between the Questionnaires 
To get more insight in the relationships between the concepts that were ex-
amined in this study, we examined the inter-correlation matrix (see Table 
3.3). Suggestibility was positively correlated to false memories (r = .19, p < 
.05). In addition, false memories and objective memory performance were 
negatively correlated (r = -.34, p < .05). The other inter-correlations failed to 
reach significance. 
Table 3.3 
Correlation Matrix of Test (Total) Scores in a Community Sample (N = 142) 
Tests GSS GCS DRM AVLT 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire -.14 .12 -.01 -.14 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale - -.06 .19* -.17 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale  - .05 -.10 
Deese-Roediger/McDermott Task   - -.34* 
Note. DRM = Recall of Critical Lures; and AVLT = Correct Immediate Recall. 
* p < .05. 
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Discussion 
The findings of the present study can be summarised as follows. Firstly, par-
ticipants who were pessimistic about their memory reported more cognitive 
failures and higher levels of compliance. Secondly, beliefs about one’s own 
memory were not related to suggestibility and false recollections. Thirdly, 
participants with more optimistic opinions about their memory exhibited 
better objective memory performance. 
Gudjonsson has described a number of cases suggesting that memory dis-
trust may contribute to false memories and false confessions (Gudjonsson, 
2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999). He argued that people with subjective mem-
ory problems have a tendency to rely on external cues and suggestions, 
making them vulnerable to false memories. Our results do only partly sup-
port this line of reasoning. Thus, we found that the SSMQ was negatively 
associated with the GCS: the more pessimistic a person’s own memory be-
liefs, the more compliant he/she is. This is understandable when one as-
sumes that people suffering from memory distrust (i.e., who evaluate their 
memory as poor) are more susceptible to the authority of others. As a result, 
they perceive the opinion of others as more important than their own opin-
ions. However, as this relationship was only based on correlations, the causal 
relationship between these two concepts cannot be established. One could 
also argue that people start to distrust their memory because they are more 
easily intimidated by authorities who might have played an active role in 
undermining the confidence in one’s memory abilities. This points out that 
the relationship between memory distrust and compliance could go both 
ways. 
In this study, we failed to find a significant correlation between the 
SSMQ and false recollections (i.e., critical lures) elicited by the DRM task. 
This finding could be explained by the moderate split-half reliability of the 
critical lures of the DRM task in this study. Furthermore, following Gudjons-
son’s line of reasoning, one would also expect elevated suggestibility levels 
in people with negative memory beliefs (Gudjonsson, 2003). Contrary to our 
expectation, we did not find evidence to support this hypothesis. Thus, no 
significant correlations were found between the SSMQ and suggestibility. 
However, it should be noted that levels of interrogative pressure during the 
GSS procedure are very modest. In the forensic cases involving memory 
distrust (Gudjonsson, 2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999), all suspects had been 
exposed to extremely high levels of interrogative stress. Therefore, our re-
sults do certainly not preclude the possibility that when people suffering 
from memory distrust are exposed to high interrogative pressure, they be-
come suggestible. We also found that the inter-correlation between false 
recollections and suggestibility was positive and reached significance. This 
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was not surprising as other studies have indicated that highly suggestible 
people are more prone to develop false memories (see e.g., Geraerts, Smeets, 
Jelicic, Van Heerden, & Merckelbach, 2005; Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Our finding that self-reported memory capabilities in young and middle 
aged participants correspond with their objective memory performance con-
trasts with research showing that older participants who believe their mem-
ory is poor perform as well as elderly people with optimistic views of their 
memory (Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds et al., 2000). It seems that our partici-
pants were more accurate in evaluating their own memory than older par-
ticipants with self-reported memory problems. Interestingly, our results fit 
nicely with those of Brewin and Stokou (2002), who found that individuals 
who judge themselves to have poor childhood memory perform worse on a 
standardised autobiographical memory test compared to those who report 
normal childhood memories. It is difficult to say why some of the older peo-
ple believe to have poor memory capabilities, while there is nothing wrong 
with their memory. Perhaps, these individuals had been confronted with 
cases of dementia in their relatives and friends. Such experiences may lead 
one to interpret normal age-related memory decline as a form of pathologi-
cal aging (Commissaris et al., 1998). Our younger and middle-aged partici-
pants may not have had these experiences and this may help to explain why 
in this group, subjective and objective memory parameters are not dissoci-
ated to such an extent as is often seen in older participants. Our sample may 
also have more realistic memory beliefs because they are more often ex-
posed to feedback information about their memory performance (e.g., in the 
context of their work or education), which could promote a better calibra-
tion. 
In addition, we found that poor memory performance (indexed by im-
mediate recall on the AVLT) was related to more false recollections (i.e., 
more critical lures). However, this was to be expected as “[… ]  (partial) am-
nesia is a necessary condition for the development of a full-blown false 
autobiographical memory” (Smeets, Merckelbach, Horselenberg, & Jelicic, 
2005, p. 925). 
There are several limitations in the present study that deserve some 
comment. First, although the correlations between subjective memory 
judgments and objective memory parameters were significant, they were by 
all standards modest. This may have to do with the fact that the sample did 
not involve patients or older persons (i.e., participants with more extreme 
opinions about their memory). Furthermore, the modest correlations may 
have to do with the fact that the test we used to measure objective memory 
performance, the AVLT, only taps a specific type of memory (i.e., learning of 
new verbal information). Second, another weakness of the present study is 
that for technical reasons, scales and tasks were given in a fixed order and 
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this may have introduced carry-over effects. Finally and most importantly, in 
our study, people with low SSMQ scores might not necessarily suffer from a 
full-blown memory distrust syndrome. It may be that some participants with 
pessimistic views about their own memory suffered from trait memory dis-
trust. However, this may not be true for the large majority of participants 
scoring low on the SSMQ. Furthermore, in Gudjonsson’s forensic cases, 
memory distrust is described as a confusional state. As the SSMQ taps a 
quality that is more trait than state by nature, our results can not be easily 
generalised to memory distrust cases. Therefore, future studies should look 
at whether individuals suffering from state memory distrust are prone to 
create false memories and have high suggestibility levels. It would be inter-
esting to examine how memory distrust is related to other types of tasks, 
notably tasks in which external pressure is high. An example is the com-
puter crash paradigm (Horselenberg et al., 2003; Horselenberg et al., 2006; 
Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). In this paradigm, innocent participants are accused 
of being responsible for a computer crash. The question rises whether people 
with negative opinions about their own memory would be more ready to 
confess than those with favourable opinions about their memory. 
For the forensic setting, our results imply that people who have optimis-
tic ideas about their memory generally show better memory performance 
and lower compliance scores than those with pessimistic views. However, 
these correlations are modest. Furthermore, people with optimistic beliefs 
about their memory are not less susceptible to suggestions and false recollec-
tions than people with pessimistic beliefs about their own memory. There-
fore, one should not regard their testimonies as more reliable. 
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Abstract 
Relying on a community sample (N = 80), the present study examined 
whether memory distrust is related to an increased tendency to accept mis-
information and whether it interacts with the passage of time. Participants 
were shown video footage of an armed robbery. Approximately 30 min later, 
they were asked to describe as accurately as possible what they had seen. 
Either 1 day or 2 weeks later they were presented with their own state-
ments, to which five misinformation items had been added. The results 
showed that people suffering from memory distrust accepted more misin-
formation than those with optimistic beliefs about their memory. In addi-
tion, both age and free recall seemed to modulate this relationship. How-
ever, memory evaluation did not interact with time interval. 
Introduction 
Eyewitness testimony is of crucial importance to the legal system. Judges 
and juries often heavily rely on such testimony when deciding on a case, 
even though they know that eyewitness evidence may not be accurate 
(Doyle, 2005). Indeed, a substantial number of studies has shown that peo-
ple’s memories can easily be distorted when incorrect post-event informa-
tion or feedback is presented (e.g., Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002; 
Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). Post-event information can be given through 
leading questions (e.g., during police interrogations), through statements 
made by authorities (e.g., in the media), or through co-witnesses (Morris, 
Laney, Bernstein, & Loftus, 2006). 
Exposure to misleading post-event information may affect people’s 
memory reports in either of two ways. First, people may have failed to at-
tend to the event and, therefore, may have poor memories. As a result, they 
are unable to come up with contradictory arguments when they are exposed 
to misinformation, making them vulnerable to incorporate the misinforma-
tion (Loftus, 2005). Second, post-event information might suggest a more 
accurate or complete version of the event than one’s own memory, resulting 
in an increased willingness to accept the misinformation (Sutherland & 
Hayne, 2001). There is some debate about how post-event misinformation 
affects the original memory: whether the original information is completely 
and permanently lost (Loftus, 2005; Loftus & Palmer, 1974) or is retained, 
but has become (partly) inaccessible (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). 
Either way, exposure to misinformation may lead people to incorporate 
incorrect information into their memories (Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). 
These incorrect elements are often endorsed with high levels of confidence 
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(Loftus, 2005). Moreover, recent research has shown that once an inaccu-
rate memory has been formed on the basis of misleading post-event infor-
mation, it remains stable across time (Devilly, Varker, Hansen, & Gist, 2007; 
but see Huffman, Crossman, & Ceci, 1997). The relevance of the misinfor-
mation effect to the legal domain is almost self-evident: it may distort eye-
witness testimony, such that it could potentially lead to wrongful convictions 
(Doyle, 2005). 
Many situational factors modulate the misinformation effect (see e.g., 
Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). A case in point is the passage of time. Research 
has shown that people are more susceptible to misinformation when time 
has had the chance to weaken the memory trace (Loftus, 2005). Thus, the 
longer the interval between the original event and exposure to post-event 
misinformation, the higher the probability that misinformation will be in-
corporated into memory. Another important factor is the way misinforma-
tion is presented. Within a social context (e.g., conversation) people are 
more likely to accept misinformation than when confronted with written 
statements (Gabbert, Memon, Allan, & Wright, 2004). Protocol presentation 
also affects misinformation detection. It appears that misinformation is de-
tected more often when eyewitnesses read their own statements after the 
interview than when the statements were read out loud by a police officer 
(Christianson, Engelberg, & Gustafson, 2007). 
Besides situational factors, individual differences appear to influence the 
misinformation effect. For example, younger children are more susceptible 
to misinformation than older children and adults (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ot-
gaar, Candel, Merckelbach, & Wade, 2009). Also, gender seems to play a role 
with women being more likely to accept and incorporate misinformation 
than men (Tomes & Katz, 1997). Furthermore, high scores on personality 
characteristics such as empathy, imagery ability, dissociation, and introver-
sion have been found to predict a larger misinformation effect (Loftus, 2005; 
Ward & Loftus, 1985). 
A less researched characteristic that may be relevant in this context is 
memory distrust (Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1982). Gudjonsson (2003) ar-
gued that people who distrust their memories tend to rely on external 
sources and cues. Memory distrust is conceptualised as a phenomenon that 
is closely related to source amnesia, since people suffering from memory 
distrust often find it difficult to distinguish between information that is in-
ternally generated and information that is externally suggested (Gudjonsson 
et al., 1999). According to Gudjonsson (2003), memory distrust may result 
from memory problems during encoding and consolidation or from police 
interrogations in which confidence in one’s memory is undermined. An-
other distinction is that between state memory distrust and trait memory 
distrust (Van Bergen, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2008). State memory distrust 
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refers to a particular situation in which one experiences a lack of trust in 
one’s memory as a result of, for example, interrogative stress and health 
problems. People with trait memory distrust, on the other hand, show a 
stable tendency to distrust their memory (Van Bergen et al., 2009). This 
latter type of memory distrust is not uncommon in the general population 
with at least 10 percent of various age groups showing pessimistic memory 
evaluations (Crombag et al., 2000). 
In legal settings, eyewitnesses who distrust their own memories (i.e., 
who lack confidence in their memories) are often treated as less credible 
than people who present their eyewitness accounts in a confident manner 
(Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1982). This practice is contradicted by extensive 
research showing that there is no clear-cut relationship between memory 
confidence and accuracy (e.g., Brewer, 2006; but see Odinot & Wolters, 
2006). Meanwhile, it is not clear whether eyewitnesses who suffer from 
memory distrust are more vulnerable to developing memory distortions 
when confronted with post-event information (e.g., during police interroga-
tions) than those who are confident in their memory. 
With these considerations in mind, the present study examined the rela-
tionship between subjective memory evaluation and the acceptance of mis-
information. In addition, following suggestions made by Christianson et al. 
(2007), it tested whether memory distrust interacted with the passage of 
time. During a first session, participants watched a video fragment of an 
armed robbery. Afterwards, they had to give an account of the event they 
had witnessed. In a second session that took place either 1 day or 2 weeks 
after the first session, they had to check the written version of their account 
to which five misinformation items had been added. We opted for adding 
items to a statement because in several European countries, including the 
Netherlands, it is standard practice that the verbal statements are not directly 
written down. Statements are later interpreted and formulated by the inter-
rogator (Van Koppen, 2007; Van Koppen & Penrod, 2003). In this way, it is 
not unlikely that misinformation ends up in written statements. 
Following Gudjonsson’s line of reasoning (2003), we expected people 
suffering from memory distrust to accept misinformation more easily than 
those with high memory confidence, especially after a long time interval 
(i.e., 2 weeks). A subsidiary aim of the present study was to explore how 
beliefs about one’s memory functioning are related to self-report indices of 
cognitive failures, compliance, and interrogative suggestibility. We expected 
that those with pessimistic beliefs about their memory would report more 
everyday lapses and cognitive blunders and would be more compliant and 
suggestible (i.e., would be more willing to rely on external sources) than 
those who are more confident in their own memory. 
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M ethods 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 80 adults (54 women). Their age varied between 18 
and 49 years (M = 33.6; SD = 9.5). Participants were recruited through ad-
vertisements in local newspapers, as well as through flyers distributed in a 
shopping mall and announcements on billboards at Maastricht University. 
During a telephone interview, they were asked to evaluate their memory 
functioning and to rate it in terms of a 10-point Likert scale (anchors: 1 = 
‘very poor’; 10 = ‘excellent’). Those people who were very confident (i.e., 
gave subjective evaluations ≥ 7) and those who were doubtful about their 
memory (i.e., gave subjective evaluations ≤ 4) were selected and assigned to 
the memory confidence and the memory distrust group, respectively. They 
were given a small financial compensation for participating. The study was 
approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
M aterials 
Video footage 
Participants were presented with 2 min video footage of a simulated armed 
robbery at a wine shop. Participants were instructed to pay close attention to 
what happened. The fragment showed a wine shop with some customers 
and the owner. Suddenly, a man flourishing a gun entered the shop. He 
ordered the customers to lie down on the floor, while the owner was forced 
to hand over the money. Finally, the robber fled the store. 
Eyewitness accounts 
Immediately after having seen the video fragment, participants were asked 
to provide a free recall about what they had seen. Their statements were 
recorded using a digital voice recorder. Subsequently, each free recall was 
written out verbatim and five misinformation items were added, consisting 
of altered and new information. These items were selected on the basis of a 
pilot study, in which six people were asked to give a detailed description of 
the fragment. From their descriptions, we chose two items that were recalled 
most often and therefore most plausible to be recalled by our future partici-
pants. These altered items were ‘the attacker wore a cap’ and ‘the total 
number of people was 6’. We replaced the first item by ‘the attacker wore a 
hood’ and the second by ‘the total number of people was 7’. When partici-
pants recalled an incorrect number of people, we added one more person to 
the number they had mentioned. In some cases, this resulted in changing 
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the number of people into the correct number. Note that, also in this case, 
the correct number of people that was reported should have been detected, 
as it differed from the number originally mentioned by the participant. The 
other three misinformation items added completely new elements because 
they were not part of the fragment and were never mentioned by any of the 
pilot participants. These items were ‘the robber nearly fell’, ‘the robber put 
the plastic bag containing the money in his pocket’, and ‘the robber held the 
customers continuously at gunpoint’. Corresponding with the procedure by 
Christianson et al. (2007), and because the altered and new items correlated 
highly (r = .53, p < .05), they were collapsed into a single variable (i.e., mis-
information detection), ranging from 0 to 5. The written eyewitness account 
was designed in such way that it looked like an official police document. 
Free recall scoring 
To score free recall, we used a procedure that was similar to that of Smeets, 
Candel, and Merckelbach (2004). During the pilot study, the video footage 
was shown to six people. They were instructed to give a detailed description. 
The items that were mentioned by at least four people were added to a scor-
ing list. The final list consisted of 20 critical details of the video fragment. 
Free recall was scored by summing the number of list items mentioned by 
the participant, ranging from 0 to 20. 
Questionnaires and tests 
We administered five tests to the participants. The first was the Dutch ver-
sion of the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; Squire et al., 
1979; Van Bergen, 2008; Van Bergen et al., 2010a; Cronbach’s α = .96). This 
is a self-report scale consisting of 18 items tapping subjective evaluations of 
one’s own memory. Items are scored on a 9-point Likert scale (-4 = disas-
trous; +4 = perfect). Sample items are ‘My ability to remember things that 
have happened more than a year ago is’ and ‘My ability to recall things 
when I really try is’. Scores are summed to obtain an SSMQ total score vary-
ing from -72 to +72, with negative scores corresponding with pessimistic 
judgements about one’s own memory and positive scores reflecting optimis-
tic memory evaluations. 
The second questionnaire was the Dutch version of the Cognitive Fail-
ures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach et al., 1996; 
Cronbach’s α = .92). The CFQ is a self-report scale that taps failures in eve-
ryday actions, perception and attention, and memory over the last month. It 
consists of 25 items that are scored on a 5-point Likert scale (anchors: 0 = 
‘never’; 4 = ‘very often’). Illustrative items are ‘Do you fail to notice sign-
posts on the road?’ and ‘Do you forget where you put something like a 
newspaper or a book?’ Scores were summed to obtain a CFQ total score 
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varying from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating more self-reported cog-
nitive failures. 
The third questionnaire was the Dutch version of the Gudjonsson Com-
pliance Scale (GCS; Gudjonsson, 1989; Smeets, 2008; Cronbach’s α = .81). 
This self-report instrument measures people’s levels of compliance. It focuses 
on two types of behaviour, namely eagerness to please others, and avoid-
ance of conflicts. The scale consists of 20 items using a true-false format. 
Examples are ‘I give in easily to people when I am pressured’ and ‘I try hard 
to do what is expected of me’. After recoding items 17 to 19, a GCS total 
score varying from 0 to 20 can be obtained by summing the number of true 
responses, with higher scores indexing more compliant behaviour. 
To measure interrogative suggestibility, the participants were given the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997; Merckelbach et al., 
1998). The GSS consists of a story that is read out loud by the experimenter. 
Participants have to answer 20 questions of which 15 are misleading and 5 
are neutral and address factual details of the story. After participants have 
answered the questions, they receive negative feedback about their perform-
ance. They are asked to answer the questions one more time and to be more 
accurate this time. Thus, all questions are answered twice and in this way 
several GSS parameters can be calculated. First, Yield1 refers to the number 
of misleading questions that the participant accepts during the first round 
(range = 0–15). Second, Yield2 refers to the number of misleading questions 
accepted during the second round (range = 0–15). Third, Shift refers to the 
number of changes that participants make in their answers after having re-
ceived negative feedback (range = 0–20). Finally, the GSS total score is the 
sum of Yield1 and Shift, with higher scores reflecting higher levels of inter-
rogative suggestibility (range = 0–35). 
The fifth test was the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test 
(NART; Nelson, 1982; Schmand, Lindeboom, & Van Harskamp, 1992), that 
gives an estimate of verbal intelligence (correlation with Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale ranging from .74 to .85 among healthy controls; Bright, 
Jaldow, & Kopelman, 2002; Schmand et al., 1992). The NART consists of 50 
irregularly spelled words that have to be pronounced. An example item is 
the word ‘enzyme’. Words can either be pronounced correctly (score = 2), 
spuriously (score = 1), or incorrectly (score = 0). Scores are summed to ob-
tain a NART score varying from 0 to 100. This score is then transformed into 
an IQ score, with a higher score reflecting a higher IQ. 
Design and Procedure 
Testing occurred in two sessions: either 1 day or 2 weeks after the partici-
pants had seen the video of the robbery. More specifically, half of the mem-
CHAPTER 4 
60 
ory distrust group (n = 20) and half of the memory confidence group (n = 
20) were asked to return to the lab 1 day after the first session. The other 
participants (n = 40) were asked to return after 2 weeks. Thus, our design 
was basically a 2 (memory group: memory distrust vs. memory confidence) 
x 2 (time interval: 1 day vs. 2 weeks) between-subjects set-up. 
During the first session, participants were asked to give informed con-
sent. Subsequently, the video footage was presented to them. Next, partici-
pants were asked to complete the SSMQ, CFQ, GCS, and NART, as well as 
some filler tasks. The order in which the tests were given was counterbal-
anced across participants. Approximately 30 min after they had seen the 
video footage, participants were asked to recall everything they could re-
member. After the first session, the recorded free recall was written out by 
the experimenter. During the second session, participants were confronted 
with their written accounts. We chose to present their accounts in this way 
since written statements play an important role in the legal system. More-
over, research has shown that people are more easily misled when post-
event information is presented in a written form (Itsukushima, Nishi, Maru-
yama, & Takahashi, 2006). We asked participants to check their testimony 
carefully. The experimenter stressed that the statements had to be correct. In 
case participants had doubts about some of the statements, they were in-
structed to underline these sentences so that these could be discussed later. 
Participants were asked to sign the testimony if they approved with its con-
tent.6 Finally, participants had to complete some filler tasks and the GSS. 
Results 
Demographic Data and Tests 
Table 4.1 shows demographic data and mean scores on self-report tests of 
the two memory groups. The memory distrust group was significantly older 
than the memory confidence group [ t(78) = 5.51, p < .05] . There were no 
gender differences between the memory groups. As expected, the memory 
distrust group had significantly lower scores on the SSMQ than the memory 
confidence group [ t(77) = 11.95, p < .05] .7 By the same token, participants 
distrusting their memory scored significantly higher on the CFQ than par-
ticipants who were very confident in their memory [ t(75) = 6.72, p < .05] . 
                                                   
6 Of the 80 participants, 31 participants signed the testimony. Despite the instruction, this group 
of 31 individuals consisted of both participants who detected misinformation and/ or rejected 
accurate information and participants who did not. 
7 The degrees of freedom vary due to missing values. 
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Regarding the GCS and the GSS total score, no significant group differences 
were found [ t(74) = 1.45, p = .15 and t(78) = 1.23, p = .22, respectively] . 
Neither were there group differences for any of the GSS subscales (i.e., 
Yield1, Yield2, Shift; all ps ns). Furthermore, both memory groups differed in 
IQ scores [ t(77) = 2.24, p < .05] , with the memory confidence group outper-
forming the memory distrust group on the NART. Finally, participants suf-
fering from memory distrust had poorer free recall (i.e., objective memory 
performance) than participants who were very confident in their memory 
[ t(78) = 2.29, p < .05] . 
Table 4.1 
Demographic Data and Mean Total Scores on Self-Report Tests of the Two 
Memory Groups (Standard Deviations are presented in Parentheses) 
Demographic data/ tests Memory distrust Memory confidence 
Gender 13 male/27 female 13 male/27 female 
Age 38.55 (7.87) 28.60 (8.27) 
SSMQ -8.32 (17.31) 34.46 (14.33) 
CFQ 49.10 (12.53) 31.13 (10.86) 
GCS 10.84 (4.08) 9.38 (4.63) 
GSS (total score) 8.13 (4.09) 7.05 (3.70) 
IQ (based on NART) 100.70 (7.81) 104.26 (6.16) 
Free recall 9.45 (2.79) 10.94 (3.01) 
M isinformation Detection 
Figure 4.1 shows the extent to which the two groups detected misinforma-
tion at the two time delays. A two-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) re-
vealed a non-significant interaction effect of memory group and time inter-
val (p = .31). After removing the interaction term, two significant main ef-
fects were found. People suffering from memory distrust detected signifi-
cantly less misinformation than people who were confident in their memory 
[F(1,77) = 5.15, p < .05, ηp² = .06] . Furthermore, participants who were 
tested after 1 day detected more misinformation than those who were tested 
after 2 weeks [F(1,77) = 14.31, p < .05, ηp² = .16] . 
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Figure 4.1. Average amount of misinformation detection of the memory 
groups (i.e., memory distrust and memory confidence) at the two time in-
tervals (i.e., 1 day and 2 weeks). 
Covariates 
A close examination of the correlation matrix showed that misinformation 
detection correlated significantly with age (r = -.26, p < .05) and free recall (r 
= .22, p = .05). As these factors might have confounded the obtained results, 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted. After removing the non-
significant interaction term between memory group and time interval, both 
age and free recall failed to reach significance (p = .27 and p = .28, respec-
tively). However, it should be noted that due to the inclusion of age and free 
recall, the main effect of memory group disappeared [F(1,75) = 1.13, p = 
.29] . The main effect of time interval was not affected by the inclusion of the 
covariates and remained significant [F(1,75) = 14.19, p < .05] . 
Rejected Accurate Information 
We also performed an ANOVA on the number of items that participants 
indicated to be incorrect, when in fact they were correct (i.e., rejected accu-
rate information). The two-way ANOVA showed no significant interaction 
effect between memory and time (p = .26) and this interaction was therefore 
removed from the model. The main effect of memory group was significant 
[F(1,77) = 4.81, p < .05, ηp² = .06] . The participants who were confident in 
their memory more often rejected correct items (M = .90, SD = 1.74, range = 
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0–7) than those suffering from memory distrust (M  = .28, SD = .55, range = 
0–2).8 The main effect of time interval failed to reach significance [F(1,77) = 
2.78, p = .10] .9 
Discussion 
Our findings can be summarised as follows. First, participants who suffer 
from memory distrust accept more misinformation than those who report to 
be confident in their memory. Second, this effect does not become stronger 
over time (i.e., no memory group x time interaction). Third, a longer time 
interval between sessions promotes acceptance of misinformation. Fourth, 
age and free recall performance seem to modulate the relationship between 
memory group and misinformation acceptance. Fifth, people who are confi-
dent in their memory more frequently reject accurate information than peo-
ple who distrust their memory. 
That our recruitment procedure was successful is shown by the fact that 
the memory distrust group reported more negative subjective memory 
evaluations (indexed by the SSMQ) and more cognitive failures (indexed by 
the CFQ) than the memory confidence group. Furthermore, the two groups 
differed with regard to the proxy measure of IQ (i.e., NART) and free recall 
performance, an issue to which we will return. 
The finding that people who believe to have poor memory abilities show 
more difficulty to detect misinformation corresponds well with our first hy-
pothesis. Apparently, people who distrust their memory more readily rely on 
external cues and suggestions, as has been proposed by Gudjonsson (2003). 
Consequently, they run a risk of incorporating misinformation into their 
memory. Conversely, confidence in one’s own memory is associated with 
less misinformation incorporation probably because it does not go along with 
an increased sensitivity to external cues. Note also that there is a fundamen-
tal integrity to memory confidence evaluations. That is, those who distrusted 
their memory exhibited poorer free recall performance than those who were 
                                                   
8 These data contain outl iers. However, they were included because they reveal relevant infor-
mation. Note that after excluding these outliers the main effect of memory group remains sig-
nificant, means being .00 (SD = .00) for the memory distrust group (i.e., they did not reject any 
accurate information) and .39 (SD = .60; range = 0–2) for the memory confidence group 
[F(1,64) = 12.87, p < .05, p² = .17] . 
9 Performing an ANCOVA on these data showed the same results as for misinformation detec-
tion. More specifically,  the covariates age and free recall were both non-significant (p = .81 and 
p = .69). Therefore, they were removed from the model. Note that including the covariates in 
the model affected the main effect of memory group (which disappeared), but not that of time 
interval (which remained non-significant). 
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confident in their memory. Overall, our findings are in line with a recent 
study by Van Bergen and colleagues (2009) showing that subjective memory 
evaluation is positively related with objective memory performance. 
We anticipated that the memory distrust group’s tendency to accept mis-
information would increase with the passage of time, but this interaction 
was not borne out by the data. It would be premature though to conclude 
that memory distrust and the passage of time are independently operating 
factors. The reason is that a ceiling effect at the two-week session (i.e., many 
participants accepting the misinformation elements) might have overruled 
an interaction effect. Thus, this issue warrants further study, probably with a 
measure of misinformation that allows for more variability. 
Indeed, we found that, after a relatively long time interval, the chance to 
detect discrepancies between authentic memory representations and misin-
formation decreases. This effect holds true both for people who are confident 
in their memory and those who distrust their memory. The effect size associ-
ated with this main effect of time was relatively large. Misinformation will 
be incorporated more easily when time passes by, because after a while it 
makes the impression of providing a more complete version of what has 
happened than one’s own recollections (Lee, 2004). 
While neither age nor free-recall was a significant covariate, together 
they seemed to be relevant, since their inclusion in the model resulted in the 
disappearance of a significant main effect of memory group. Why this oc-
curred becomes more comprehensible when looking at the zero-order corre-
lations between subjective memory evaluation and age (r = -.53, p < .05), 
between memory evaluation and free recall (r = .25, p < .05), and between 
age and free recall (r = -.40, p < .05). That older people more frequently 
distrust their memory has been reported a number of times (Commissaris et 
al., 1998; Ponds & Jolles, 1996; Ponds et al., 2000). We do not think that age 
has a direct influence on the acceptance of misinformation in memory. 
Rather, it seems that when people grow older, some of them will start to 
attribute memory difficulties to internal (organic) factors, rather than blam-
ing such problems on external (situational) factors (Commissaris et al., 
1998). As a result, memory distrust is more frequent in older than in 
younger people, even though our group of participants suffering from mem-
ory distrust is still considerably younger than the samples described in the 
above mentioned studies. 
The fact that free recall together with age moderates the relationship be-
tween memory group and acceptance of misinformation is interesting. Ac-
cording to the discrepancy detection principle (Schooler & Loftus, 1993; 
Tousignant, Hall, & Loftus, 1986), having detailed and accurate memories 
about an event allows people to detect discrepancies between the original 
event and misinformation that is provided about that event. So, poor free 
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recall performance will on the one hand, fuel one’s negative memory 
evaluations (see also: Van Bergen et al., 2010a; Van Bergen et al., 2009), and 
on the other hand, it will make one vulnerable to accepting misinformation. 
This study also looked at the rejection of accurate information. Interest-
ingly, participants with memory distrust less often rejected accurate informa-
tion than participants who were confident in their own memory. At first 
sight, this seems to contradict the pattern that we found for the detection of 
misinformation. Thus, while participants were less correct when it came to 
accepting misinformation, they were more accurate in rejecting accurate 
information, relative to the memory confidence group. An obvious explana-
tion for this is that our participants were confronted with an external source 
claiming to reflect their written statements. Compared to the memory confi-
dence group, memory distrust individuals were less likely to express doubts 
about their statements, whether these were true or false. As scores on the 
self-report tests show, this difference is unlikely to be a product of group 
differences in compliance or interrogative suggestibility. As a matter of fact, 
participants suffering from memory distrust did not have higher scores on 
the GCS and the GSS than memory confidence participants. Previous studies 
have shown that the relationship between subjective memory evaluations 
and memory accuracy is a complex one (e.g., Odinot & Wolters, 2006; 
Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). Our finding that memory distrust is 
accompanied by both heightened levels of misinformation acceptance and 
lowered levels of incorrect rejections further underlines this point. To put 
this finding into perspective, note that the highest average amount of re-
jected accurate information (i.e., in the memory confidence group) was still 
lower than 1. Furthermore, both in the memory distrust group and memory 
confidence group the majority of participants did not reject any accurate 
information (77.5% vs. 60%, respectively). 
There is reason to believe that levels of misinformation acceptance might 
be even higher if misinformation had been introduced in a more social way, 
for example during a conversation with a confederate (Gabbert et al., 2004). 
We anticipate that the increase of the effect would be higher in the memory 
distrust group since people suffering from memory distrust are more prone 
to rely on suggestions by others (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
The limitations of the present study deserve some comment. First, an ad 
hoc criterion was adopted to recruit participants for one of the two memory 
groups. In future research, it might be of interest to use multiple criteria and 
to select more extreme groups. Second, there was a significant age difference 
between both memory groups. Therefore, future studies on memory distrust 
and misinformation should match for age. In doing so, they will be able to 
avoid that age becomes a difficult covariate to interpret, as was the case in 
the present study. Finally, the current study was correlational by nature and 
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so it remains to be seen whether poor free recall performance is the principle 
driver of memory distrust and heightened levels of misinformation accep-
tance. A closer look at participants’ memory functioning would therefore be 
useful in future studies. Studies in which this causal interpretation can be 
directly tested would further increase our understanding. 
As eyewitness testimonies bear strong relevance to forensic settings, it is 
important to examine factors that might affect their reliability. Since eyewit-
nesses who distrust their memory are often considered to be more suscepti-
ble to memory distortions, they will be treated as less credible than people 
without memory complaints (Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1982). The present 
study shows that there is some wisdom to this because people suffering from 
memory distrust are indeed more vulnerable to misinformation than those 
who are very confident in their memory. The most important implication of 
our study, however, is that eyewitnesses or suspects suffering from memory 
distrust should be interviewed or interrogated in a prudent way. 
PART 2 
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Abstract 
Extensive research has shown that certain interrogation techniques may lead 
to false confessions. Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1982) argued that the 
memory distrust syndrome could underlie some of these false confessions. In 
the current study, we examined the relation between memory distrust, false 
confessions, and several interrogation techniques, by accusing innocent un-
dergraduate students (N = 50) of exam fraud. To this end, we used five inter-
rogation techniques, namely providing false technical evidence, providing 
false eyewitness evidence, minimising, maximising, and suggesting memory 
problems. We found that suggesting memory problems had the largest im-
pact on memory distrust. Furthermore, it appeared that people were most 
willing to confess when false technical evidence was provided. Although we 
found that in all interrogation techniques, memory distrust scores correlated 
highly with false confession scores, they did not have a uniform effect. Sev-
eral explanations for, and implications of these findings, are discussed. 
Introduction 
Police interrogations often consist of a variety of interrogation techniques. In 
worst case scenarios, suspects are exposed to suggestive questions, false evi-
dence, and several other ploys. A well-known procedure in the interrogation 
literature is the Reid technique (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2001). This 
technique consists of nine steps, which all aim at obtaining a confession from 
the suspect. The main objection to this technique is the high level of pres-
sure that suspects are exposed to, sometimes giving room to false confessions 
(Gudjonsson, 2001). To protect the interrogated individual, the Reid tech-
nique is prohibited in several European countries (Vrij, 1998). However, 
some of these techniques and many others, that can be harmful to the sus-
pect too, are still found in the interrogation room (Pearse & Gudjonsson, 
1999). 
In some of these techniques false evidence is presented to the suspect 
(Leo, 1996). This may vary from footage of non-existing cameras, false tes-
timonies of eyewitnesses, to non-existent fingerprints found at the crime 
scene. Although prohibited in several countries, using false evidence is quite 
powerful in evoking false confessions. Other techniques basically consist of 
active persuasion. For example, interrogators may communicate absolute 
certainty that a suspect is guilty (Henkel & Coffman, 2004). In this way, 
suspects come to believe that denying their involvement in the crime is 
pointless and tend to confess. In another example of maximisation, the con-
sequences of the crime are exaggerated by the interrogator (Hartwig, Gran-
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hag, & Vrij, 2005; Kassin & McNall, 1991). This often results in strong feel-
ings of guilt in suspects. Minimisation, on the other hand, intends to reduce 
the responsibility of the suspect. As a result, suspects may trivialise the crime 
and will more easily confess to the crime (Hartwig et al., 2005; Kassin & 
McNall, 1991). Another way of manipulating suspects, is undermining their 
confidence in their memories (Henkel & Coffman, 2004). Of course, the 
techniques mentioned above are just a minority of all the interrogation 
techniques that are used by the police. 
Extensive research has shown that false confessions resulting from ques-
tionable interrogations are a common phenomenon (e.g., Kassin & Gudjons-
son, 2004; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). These false confessions can be divided 
into three different types: voluntary false confessions, coerced-compliant 
false confessions, and coerced-internalised false confessions (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1985). Voluntary false confessions occur without any external 
pressure from the police and the motives behind them have to do with, for 
example, the suspect’s desire for notoriety. Coerced-compliant and coerced-
internalised false confessions, on the other hand, result from interrogative 
pressure. In cases of coerced-compliant false confessions, suspects remain 
convinced of their innocence, despite their confessions. Their confessions 
can best be seen as an attempt to escape from the interrogation situation or 
to avoid being locked up in police custody. In cases of coerced-internalised 
false confessions, individuals come to believe that they have committed the 
crime. They hold on to their confession even though they lack crime-related 
knowledge (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1982) argue that the memory distrust syn-
drome could underlie this last category of false confessions. This syndrome 
can be defined as “a condition where people develop profound distrust of 
their memory recollections, as a result of which they are particularly suscep-
tible to relying on external cues and suggestions” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 
196). The memory distrust syndrome is associated with two different condi-
tions: a) memory problems related to faulty encoding or consolidation dur-
ing the criminal events (e.g., due to drug or alcohol use); b) manipulation 
and undermining of the suspect’s confidence in his memory during police 
interrogations (Gudjonsson, 2003). This chapter only deals with the latter 
condition, as the confidence of participants was also challenged by the inter-
rogation techniques that were used in the current experiment. 
Gudjonsson has described several cases of false confessions in which 
memory distrust seems to play a crucial role (Gudjonsson, 2003). Typically, 
suspects’ statements in these cases develop from “I have not committed this 
crime” to “I do not know if I did this”, and “I could have done this”, into “I 
must have done it” (e.g., Gudjonsson et al., 1999, p. 456). Case studies on 
memory distrust and false confessions can be taken to imply that memory 
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distrust is a state-like characteristic, which is usually temporary and results 
from a disturbed thinking process (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
In the present study, we wanted to explore to what extent memory con-
fidence of healthy and intelligent young people can be undermined by inter-
rogation techniques that are suspected of evoking false confessions. There-
fore, we selected interrogation techniques that we expected to be most 
promising in creating memory distrust. Furthermore, we were interested in 
the relation between memory confidence and the tendency to confess. On 
the basis of cases described by Gudjonsson (e.g., Gudjonsson et al., 1999), it 
was expected that memory distrust and tendency to falsely confess would 
co-occur. To increase the ecological validity of the experiment, we chose for 
a setting in which undergraduate students were accused of exam fraud. 
M ethods 
Participants 
Our sample consisted of 50 undergraduate psychology students (36 women) 
of Maastricht University. Their mean age was 20.04 years (SD = 1.41; range 
= 18–24). The participants were naive as to the real purpose of the experi-
ment. They were told that they had to perform a series of cognitive tasks and 
complete several questionnaires. The session lasted for one hour. They were 
compensated with research credits for participating in our study. The re-
search was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a small laboratory room which was designed 
to resemble an interrogation room. Upon arrival, participants signed in-
formed consent. Following this, they had to organise two files of forensic 
cases that were deliberately mixed up. We told them that we were interested 
in how accurate and fast they would be able to do this. While participants 
were busy with this task, a paper with the upcoming exam of the current 
curriculum module was left on their table and the experimenter left the 
room. 
After approximately 5 min, the experimenter returned in distress, 
searched for the exam paper and when found, left the room again, but did 
not close the door entirely. In this way, the participant was able to hear a 
conversation in which the experimenter told another person, who was wait-
ing in the corridor, that the participant may have looked into the exam. 
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When returning to the room again, the experimenter still appeared dis-
tressed. After the participants had organised the files, they were given a pa-
per that stated: ‘From this moment on you are suspected of exam fraud. 
Imagine that you are seated in an interrogation room. You will be given 
descriptions of a couple of situations and I would like to ask you to put real 
effort in imagining those situations. You are suspected of looking into the 
exam of the current curriculum module. This is a violation according to the 
Rules and Regulations of the Act on Higher Education and Research. Try to 
imagine the given situation as clearly as possible, before answering the ques-
tions’. 
After reading this instruction, the participants were confronted with five 
different interrogation situations. In between these interrogation situations 
they completed several questionnaires that served as fillers. The interroga-
tion situations and questionnaires were counterbalanced across participants. 
A hidden camera was used to check whether the participants had looked 
in the exam paper. The footage showed that all participants were innocent of 
committing exam fraud. 
Instruments 
Interrogation techniques 
We selected those techniques described by Henkel and Coffman (2004) that 
might bear relevance to memory distrust. 
One of the interrogation descriptions included false technical evidence. It 
was stated that a camera had recorded the person skipping through the test: 
‘A hidden camera in this room registered that you grabbed the exam and 
looked into it’. Another interrogation description involved a false eyewitness 
testimony, which read as followed: ‘Fred Dragstra, one of the assistants, just 
walked by and looked into the room. He saw you looking into the exam’. A 
third strategy aimed at minimising the offence: ‘I can imagine why you have 
looked into this exam. I probably would have done the same, if it would be 
lying here on this table. Any person would have done that. And naturally, 
you want to have a good grade for your next exam’. A fourth situation was 
based on the maximising strategy: ‘The problem is that you might share its 
content with other students. The course coordinator is therefore obliged to 
make a completely new exam. The course coordinator is, however, not able 
to do this, as his wife just gave birth to a baby with a heart defect’. A fifth 
interrogation description suggested memory problems and read as follows: ‘It 
happens quite regularly that healthy people cannot remember certain ac-
tions. This usually happens in case of an automatic action. It is very plausible 
that this also applies to you and that you, automatically but unconsciously, 
looked at that exam, so that you cannot vividly remember it anymore’. 
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All five descriptions were followed by two questions: ‘To what extent 
would you distrust your memory right now?’ and ‘To what extent would 
you be willing to confess that you have inspected the exam paper?’. Partici-
pants had to answer these questions on 100mm Visual Analogue Scales 
(VASs; anchors: 0 = ‘not at all’; 100 = ‘totally’). As answering the first ques-
tion may lead participants to be more inclined to answer the second question 
in the same way, we presented the questions on separate pages. 
Subjective cognitive functioning 
The Dutch version of the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ; 
Squire et al., 1979; Van Bergen, 2008; Van Bergen et al., 2010a; Cronbach’s 
α = .87) was used to measure confidence in memory functioning. This self-
report questionnaire consists of 18 items, which are scored on a 9-point 
Likert scale (anchors: -4 = ‘disastrous’; +4 = ‘perfect’). Sample items are ‘My 
ability to recall things when I really try is’ and ‘My ability to remember 
things that have happened more than a year ago is’. Scores were summed to 
obtain an SSMQ total score varying from -72 to +72, with negative scores 
indicating memory distrust. This questionnaire was part of a survey which 
was performed several weeks before the experiment. 
As another index of subjective memory functioning, we administered 
the Dutch version of the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent 
et al., 1982; Merckelbach et al., 1996; Cronbach’s α = .84). The CFQ consists 
of 25 items, which measure self-report frequency of everyday failures in 
memory, perception/attention, and action. Illustrative items are ‘Do you 
forget where you put something like a newspaper or a book?’, ‘Do you fail 
to notice signposts on the road?’, and ‘Do you drop things?’. Participants are 
asked to indicate on a 5-point Likert scale how often they have experienced 
each cognitive failure during the past months (anchors: 0 = ‘never’; 4 = ‘very 
often’). Scores are summed to obtain a CFQ total score, with higher scores 
reflecting more self-reported cognitive failures. 
Attribution style 
The Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al., 1982; Cronbach’s 
α = .69) was used to get a better impression of the participants’ attribution 
styles. That is, whether they tend to attribute negative and positive situations 
either externally or internally. They were given 10 situations. Sample items 
are ‘You run into an acquaintance who compliments you on your looks’ and 
‘You give an important presentation for a group, but the audience reacts 
negatively’. These items were followed by several questions. We were par-
ticularly interested in the answer they gave to the question ‘Could this cause 
be attributed to you or to other people or situations?’. The answers are rated 
on 7-point Likert scales (anchors: 1 = ‘totally attributed to other people and 
situations’; 7 = ‘totally attributed to myself’). Scores are summed with a 
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lower score indicating an external attribution style, and a higher score re-
flecting an internal attribution style. 
Other questionnaires 
Apart from these questionnaires, we used several other questionnaires that 
will not be described here because they are theoretically irrelevant to the 
issue under consideration. These filler questionnaires had two goals: first, to 
conceal the real purpose of the experiment, and second, to avoid cross-over 
effects of the interventions. 
Results 
Questionnaires 
Table 5.1 shows total scores and standard deviations of participants on the 
SSMQ, CFQ, and ASQ. In general, mean total scores come close to what has 
been found in other studies relying on undergraduate samples (Merckelbach 
et al., 1996; Peterson et al., 1982; Van Bergen et al., 2010a). Table 5.1 also 
presents Pearson product-moment correlations between these measures. As 
can be seen, the correlational pattern is in the expected direction. That is, 
memory confidence (i.e., SSMQ) correlated significantly with cognitive fail-
ures (i.e., CFQ). Furthermore, internal attribution (i.e., ASQ) was related to 
lower levels of subjective confidence in one’s own memory functioning (i.e., 
SSMQ). 
All relevant questionnaires were included as covariates in the analyses 
below. However, they were all non-significant and therefore excluded from 
the data analyses. Thus in what follows, results of analyses without these 
covariates are presented. 
Table 5.1  
Mean Total Scores and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Scores on all 
Relevant Questionnaires, followed by Pearson Product-Moment Correlation 
Coefficients  
Questionnaires M SD CFQ ASQ 
Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire 18.04 15.75 -.39* -.32* 
Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 39.36 10.48 - .03 
Attribution Style Questionnaire 45.39 6.94  - 
* p < .05. 
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Interrogation Techniques and M emory Distrust 
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed that there was a 
significant within-subject difference among interrogation techniques: 
F(4,196) = 3.05, p < .05 (see Table 5.2). Bonferroni corrected post-hoc 
analyses showed that this effect was caused by the difference between the 
minimising manipulation and the suggesting memory problems manipula-
tion on memory distrust scores (p < .05, d = .42). In other words, minimising 
evoked significantly lower levels of memory distrust than suggesting mem-
ory problems. 
To assure that the scores of participants were caused by the interrogation 
techniques and not by trait memory distrust, we also measured baseline 
memory distrust in a control group of undergraduates (N = 35) who had not 
participated in the experiment. In other words, they had to estimate the 
tendency to distrust their memory, imagining a situation in which they were 
accused of exam fraud while in fact they were innocent. The reason why we 
opted for undergraduates who did not participate in the study, was to over-
come potential crossover effects between baseline ratings and the other rat-
ings of the five interrogation situations during the experiment. The baseline 
rating was also scored on a 100mm VAS. The average of the VAS scores was 
7.97 (SD = 8.56). One sample t-tests showed that the tendency to distrust 
your memory in each interrogation situation differed significantly from base-
line (all ps < .05). 
Table 5.2 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Tendencies to distrust 
their Memory for all Interrogation Descriptions, followed by the Number 
(and Percentage) of Participants scoring above Midpoint 
Interrogation description M SD Score > 50 
Technical evidence 26.38 32.43 13 (26%) 
Eyewitness testimony 23.96 26.99 10 (20%) 
Minimising 17.68 18.78 4 (8%) 
Maximising 20.38 24.20 9 (18%) 
Suggesting memory problems 28.14 29.95 14 (28%) 
 
Another way to approach the issue of how interrogation affects memory 
distrust is to look at the number of participants who rated their memory 
distrust higher than 50. This refers to the number of participants who scored 
higher than midpoint on the VAS, and therefore showed a noteworthy in-
crease in memory distrust. Table 5.2 also shows these frequencies. As can be 
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seen, in each interrogation situation at least some of the participants tended 
to distrust their memory (varying from 4 participants in the minimising ma-
nipulation to 14 participants in the suggesting memory problems manipula-
tion). 
Interrogation Techniques and Confessions 
A repeated measures ANOVA performed on confession ratings yielded also 
significant differences between interrogation techniques: F(4,196) = 12.47, p 
< .05. As can be seen in Table 5.3, the interrogation description that elicited 
the strongest tendency to falsely confess was the false technical evidence 
description. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses indicated that this tech-
nique differed significantly from all the others. That is, false technical evi-
dence induced higher false confession ratings than false eyewitness testi-
mony (p < .05, d = .48), minimising (p < .05, d = .66), maximising (p < .05, 
d = .50), and suggesting memory problems (p < .05, d = .88). 
Again, baseline measurements were performed to assure the impact of the 
interrogation techniques. The average tendency to confess without any in-
terrogation technique was 6.34 (SD = 8.30). One sample t-tests showed that 
tendency to confess in all interrogation techniques differed significantly from 
this baseline measurement (all ps < .05) 
Table 5.3 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of Participants’ Tendencies to falsely 
confess for all Interrogation Descriptions, followed by the Number (and Per-
centage) of Participants scoring above Midpoint 
Interrogation description M SD Score > 50 
Technical evidence 51.16 38.49 28 (56%) 
Eyewitness testimony 34.16 31.99 18 (36%) 
Minimising 28.42 30.04 12 (28%) 
Maximising 33.52 31.26 17 (34%) 
Suggesting memory problems 22.48 25.51 7 (14%) 
 
Table 5.3 also shows the frequency of confession ratings exceeding midpoint 
(> 50) per interrogation description. This refers to the number of participants 
who scored higher than midpoint on the VAS, and therefore showed a re-
markable tendency to falsely confess. As can be seen in this table, in all in-
terrogation descriptions quite a few participants had a tendency to falsely 
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confess. When exposed to false technical evidence, more than half of the 
people (56%) exceeded the midpoint. 
M emory Distrust and False Confessions 
Table 5.4 shows r² indices, which represent the amount of variability in false 
confessions that is explained by memory distrust for each interrogation 
situation. These indices were obtained by squaring the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients between memory distrust and false confession tendency. In gen-
eral, we found that memory distrust scores significantly correlated with false 
confession scores among all interrogation techniques (rs varied from .31 to 
.54), yet the amount of explained variance (r²) varied from a low 10% to a 
high 29%. 
Table 5.4 
Explained Variance (r²) Coefficients between Tendency to Distrust Memory 
and the Tendency to falsely confess for each Interrogation Technique sepa-
rately  
Interrogation description r² 
Technical evidence 9.6 
Eyewitness testimony 17.6 
Minimising 29.2 
Maximising 19.4 
Suggesting memory problems 24.0 
Note. All ps < .05. 
Discussion 
It is well documented that a confession is the strongest type of evidence and 
triers of fact tend to perceive it as ultimate proof of guilt (Kassin & Neu-
mann, 1997; Vrij, 1998). Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1982) argued that peo-
ple with memory distrust might be more prone to falsely confess. The results 
of this study show that memory distrust is not always a static, trait-like phe-
nomenon. Rather, under the influence of interrogation techniques, people 
may vary in their tendency to distrust their memory. We found that suggest-
ing memory problems increases people’s tendency to distrust their memory 
most. Presenting false technical evidence (i.e., camera footage), on the other 
hand, resulted in the strongest tendency to falsely confess. Thus, interroga-
tion techniques do not have a uniform effect on memory distrust and false 
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confessions. Indeed, the relationship between memory distrust and false 
confession tendencies is far from perfect. 
Although confronting suspects with false evidence is prohibited in sev-
eral countries outside the United States, it is not uncommon (Pearse & Gud-
jonsson, 1999). Even if false evidence is not explicitly mentioned during an 
interrogation, police officers may insinuate that evidence is available. Fur-
thermore, little is known about the techniques which are used during off-
the-record interviews (Vrij, 1998). In accordance with the work by Kassin 
and Wrightsman (1985), our results show that techniques capitalising on 
false evidence promote false confessions. People may start to believe that 
there might be incriminating evidence and therefore tend to confess (Vrij, 
1998). 
The memory distrust measured in this experiment can be seen as state 
memory distrust. Table 5.1 shows that the mean SSMQ total score before 
any manipulation was above midpoint, meaning that our participants did 
not generally distrust their memory. So they cannot be classified as people 
with trait memory distrust. Only three individuals scored lower than mid-
point on the SSMQ before the experiment. However, as can be seen in Table 
5.2, the number of participants that started to distrust their memory after 
the manipulations was higher. This type of memory distrust is equivalent to 
memory distrust described in Gudjonsson’s cases (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Our results indicate that suggesting memory problems results in the 
strongest tendency to distrust one’s own memory. In a way, this was to be 
expected, as the content of the memory problem technique corresponds to 
the question that is asked later (i.e., whether people distrust their memory). 
The crux of the memory problem technique is that people are given an ex-
planation as to why they have forgotten their illegal behaviour. In a way, 
this technique can be conceptualised as a minimising technique. However, as 
can be seen in Table 5.2, the suggesting memory problems technique and 
the minimising technique differed significantly in the extent to which they 
affect memory distrust scores. Indeed, there is an important difference be-
tween these two strategies. In the suggesting memory problems description, 
people were told explicitly that they might have looked into the exam paper, 
due to a process that happens automatically. On the other hand, the mini-
mising technique implied that a person should have been fully aware of the 
violation. Of course, memory distrust will be strongest for actions that are 
not monitored consciously. The confidence undermining power of suggest-
ing memory problems is also illustrated in case studies on false confessions 
(Gudjonsson, 2003). 
With respect to the relationship between memory distrust and false con-
fessions, we can conclude that for each interrogation technique, these two 
concepts are positively, but far from perfectly, correlated in each interroga-
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tion technique (see Table 5.4). In other words, if distrust in your memory 
increases, you will be more likely to confess and vice versa, but there also 
seem to be other factors that play a role in false confessions. Also, no conclu-
sions can be drawn about causal direction of the link between memory dis-
trust and false confessions. On theoretical grounds, it would be most logical 
to assume that memory distrust results in false confessions (Gudjonsson, 
2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999), but this issue needs further study. 
To investigate this causal issue, one could elicit memory distrust in one 
of two groups, and then subject both groups to a false confession paradigm 
(e.g., Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). 
If creating memory distrust would result in a significant group difference, 
this would be strong evidence for memory distrust as an antecedent of false 
confessions. 
A number of limitations of this study deserve comments. First, due to 
constraints imposed by our ethical committee, this experiment was designed 
as a thought experiment. That is, instead of being accused directly, people 
had to imagine the situations. This imaginative character may have reduced 
our effects. Still, the results indicate that some interrogation techniques 
make healthy, intelligent students susceptible to distrust their memory and 
to confess to violations that they have not committed. Also, we believe that 
the results may be generalised to real-life situations, as former studies have 
already shown that imagination may be strong enough to have behavioural 
consequences (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, & Loftus, 2005; Scoboria, Mazzoni, 
& Jarry, 2008). Moreover, Scoboria et al. (2008) state that suggestions about 
past events may have more persistent effects on behaviour than on self-
reports. This confirms our expectation that the self-reported scores on the 
VASs are an underestimation of the effects in real life interrogation settings.  
A second limitation concerns the ecological validity of our experiment. 
As there was no real pressure exerted during our experiment, it was not 
representative as a real interrogation setting. In addition, the descriptions of 
the scenarios were rather short. More extensive scenarios could have attrib-
uted to a more complete impression of an interrogation setting and as would 
have accounted for larger effects; on the other hand, in real life interroga-
tions, police officers most often use manipulations consisting of only short 
messages. 
Third, a within-subject design was used in this experiment. We chose for 
this design to increase ecological validity, as in police interrogations most of 
the times, more than one technique is used. However, in future studies, it 
might be interesting to use a between-subjects design. An argument favour-
ing this design is that we expect that it would evoke larger differences be-
tween the interrogation techniques, as people would probably not give an-
swers that contradict each other, which happens in a within-subject design. 
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On the other hand, research has shown that in real interrogations, suspects 
stick to their starting position most of the time (Baldwin, 1993). 
Fourth, but related to the first limitation, the participants in this experi-
ment were all undergraduate students. There is reason to believe that un-
dergraduates will be less susceptible to distrust their memory, as they are 
intelligent people who have good memory in general, compared to others. 
Some groups of individuals, for example, people with Attention Deficit Hy-
peractivity Disorder (ADHD) have been found to be more susceptible to 
memory distrust as a result of the little confidence they have in their mem-
ory (Gudjonsson et al., 2007). Furthermore, other studies have shown that 
undergraduates do not differ from prison inmates and people in the general 
community with regard to false confessions (Horselenberg, Smeets, & Zon-
nenberg, 2007). This indicates that our results found in undergraduate stu-
dents can at least be seen as a realistic mirror of the effects in real life inter-
rogations, as they do not differ a lot from the general public. Therefore, we 
believe that the results obtained in this study can be generalised to the gen-
eral public, however, we expect that in a real-life setting in which more 
pressure is exerted on other groups of individuals (e.g., people with ADHD), 
the effect of suggesting memory problems or memory distrust would be even 
larger. 
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CHAPTER 6 
M EM ORY DISTRUST and 
FALSE CONFESSIONS 
 
 
 
Van Bergen, S., Merckelbach, H., Horselenberg, R., Jelicic, M., & Zuidberg, 
B. (2011). Did I do that? Memory distrust promotes internalised false confes-
sions. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
CHAPTER 6 
84 
Abstract 
We examined the link between memory distrust and false confessions. Using 
the computer crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), undergraduates (N = 
80) were falsely accused of having caused a computer crash. Their memory 
distrust was manipulated by providing them with negative bogus feedback 
on a practice trial and/or giving them negative feedback as part of the Gud-
jonsson Suggestibility Scale prior to the computer test. Negative feedback 
given prior to the computer crash resulted in higher rates of internalised 
false confessions compared to not receiving any feedback (69% vs. 22%, 
respectively). 
Introduction 
According to many police officers, the main goal of a police interrogation is 
to obtain a confession as this increases the chance of a successful conviction. 
Conti (1999) estimates that approximately 80% of the criminal cases are 
solved by a confession. Although the prevalence of false confessions is un-
known, numerous legal cases suggest that they occur more often than is 
usually assumed by law professionals (Costanzo & Leo, 2007; Gudjonsson, 
2003; Kassin et al., 2010). Thus, statistics gathered about DNA exoneration 
cases show that false confessions are an important antecedent of proven 
wrongful convictions, occurring in more than 15% of these cases (Saks & 
Koehler, 2005). Although such cases are often portrayed in the media, most 
police officers still believe that people do not confess to crimes they did not 
commit (Henkel & Coffman, 2004; Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). 
Several studies have examined the phenomenon of false confessions in 
the laboratory. Most of them used the computer crash paradigm (e.g., Horse-
lenberg et al., 2003; Horselenberg et al., 2006; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). In 
this paradigm, a participant is instructed to retype words or characters as fast 
as possible and is warned not to touch the Alt-key because this may cause 
the computer to crash. However, approximately after 1 min the computer 
crashes and the participant is accused of having touched the Alt-key. After 
the participant has been asked to sign a confession, the experimenter leaves 
the room and some time later a confederate enters. The confederate’s task is 
to find out whether the participant really believes that he/she had touched 
the Alt-key (i.e., internalised the confession) or that the participant just con-
fessed to be relieved from the pressure exerted by the experimenter while 
knowing that he/she did not touch the Alt-key. 
Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) proposed a taxonomy of different types 
of false confessions: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalised 
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false confessions. Gudjonsson (2003) changed the terms ‘coerced’ into ‘pres-
sured’ and extended it with a classification of the sources of pressure, in a 
refinement of the original framework. The current study focuses on what 
Gudjonsson termed pressured-compliant false confessions and pressured-
internalised false confessions. Pressured-compliant false confessions occur 
when suspects want to escape from an aversive interrogation or when they 
want to obtain a promised reward (Gudjonsson, 2003). In such cases, a con-
fession is merely an act of compliance. Pressured-internalised false confes-
sions, on the other hand, refer to cases in which innocent suspects come to 
believe that they were involved in criminal acts (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 
2004). Often, they also develop false memories for the details of these acts 
(Kassin, 2005). Most cases of pressured-internalised false confessions have 
the following elements in common: a vulnerable suspect who is exposed to 
transient factors associated with the crime, interrogation, or custody (e.g., 
stress, fatigue, intoxication), who has poor memory and who is confronted 
with false evidence, resulting in a tentative admission of guilt that is finally 
converted into a fully detailed confession (Kassin, 2007). 
A factor that is believed to contribute to pressured-internalised false con-
fessions and that bears relevance to two of these components (i.e., vulner-
able suspect and poor memory) is memory distrust (Gudjonsson et al., 1999; 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). Memory distrust is defined as “a condition 
where people develop profound distrust of their memory recollections, as a 
result of which they are particularly susceptible to relying on external cues 
and suggestions” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 196). People suffering from memory 
distrust, therefore, easily mistake false memories for authentic memories. 
Two forms of memory distrust can be distinguished: trait and state memory 
distrust (Van Bergen et al., 2009). Trait memory distrust can be seen as a 
personality characteristic. People scoring high on this trait regularly have 
habitual doubts about their own memory capabilities. State memory distrust, 
on the other hand, is temporary and is mainly described in forensic case 
vignettes and is evoked by interrogative pressure. 
In laboratory studies, state memory distrust can be manipulated, 
amongst others, by providing false feedback. An example of this can be 
found in the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS; Gudjonsson, 1997). The 
GSS can be used either as a practical tool to identify individuals’ susceptibil-
ity to suggestive influences or as a research instrument for obtaining a 
clearer understanding of the nature and mechanism of interrogative sug-
gestibility. The GSS also measures the tendency of people to shift their an-
swers after receiving negative feedback. The more people start to doubt their 
recollections, the more often they will shift their answers. According to Gud-
jonsson (2003), the Shift score can be seen as an index of state memory dis-
trust. 
CHAPTER 6 
86 
Although memory distrust is often mentioned anecdotally as an impor-
tant factor in false confessions cases, few studies have systematically looked 
at this factor. One of the few studies in this area examined the relationship 
between memory distrust, false confessions, and interrogation techniques 
(Van Bergen et al., 2008). Participants were falsely accused of exam fraud 
and were subsequently confronted with five different interrogation tech-
niques: providing false technical evidence, providing false eyewitness evi-
dence, minimisation (i.e., trivialising the crime), maximisation (i.e., drama-
tising the consequences of the crime), and suggesting memory problems. Not 
surprisingly, the latter technique resulted in the strongest tendency to dis-
trust one’s own memory. Importantly, memory distrust was related to false 
confessions. Note, however, that this study relied on a correlational design, 
which precludes any claims as to the causal link between memory distrust 
and false confessions. 
Using the computer crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), the pre-
sent study addressed this causal link. Memory distrust was manipulated by 
giving negative bogus feedback on a practice trial and/or by administering 
the GSS (Gudjonsson, 1997). Although these manipulations differed in 
wording, they both contained comments about poor memory performance 
and hence might be expected to promote state memory distrust. We ex-
pected that relative to the control condition (in which no feedback was 
given), higher levels of memory distrust in the negative feedback groups 
would elicit more internalised false confessions in these groups. 
M ethod 
Participants 
In total, 80 undergraduate students (67 women; M = 19.6; SD = 1.4) partici-
pated. Participants were assigned to one of four conditions. In condition 1, 
participants received negative bogus feedback on the practice trial and were 
given the GSS before the computer task. In condition 2, participants were 
given negative feedback on their practice trial and the GSS was administered 
after the computer task. In condition 3, the GSS was administered before the 
computer task, but no feedback was given on the practice trial. Finally, in 
the control group (condition 4), no comments were made about the practice 
trial and the GSS was administered after the computer crash. The study was 
approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
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M aterials 
Computer task 
A Dell PC was used running a Delphi computer programme in Windows. 
Words appeared on a 19-inch screen in black against a grey background. 
After retyping the words, participants had to press ‘enter’ resulting in the 
appearance of the next word. During the practice trial, 15 words were pre-
sented to make the participants accustomed to the test. After the practice 
trial, participants were asked whether they remembered making any mis-
takes followed by false feedback. During the test trial, the computer was 
programmed to crash after the 31st word (i.e., after approximately 1 min). A 
screen appeared that indicated that the computer had crashed and that the 
person should contact the administrator. If participants unintentionally hit 
the Alt-key, a different screen appeared. In fact, none of the participants did 
so. 
Manipulation check 
To check whether people developed memory distrust, a scale consisting of 10 
items was administered, with 9 bogus items pertaining to mood, memory 
and concentration and 1 critical item (i.e., ‘I distrust my memory’). Partici-
pants had to answer items on a 100mm visual analogue scale (anchors: 0 = 
‘not at all’; 100 = ‘extremely’). The scale was administered twice: before the 
practice trial and after the computer crash. 
GSS 
The GSS (Gudjonsson, 1984, 1997) was administered to elicit memory dis-
trust as it also involves negative bogus feedback. Briefly, the GSS consists of 
a story about a robbery that is read aloud to the participants and that is fol-
lowed by 20 questions (consisting of 15 suggestive questions and 5 memory 
questions). After having answered all questions, negative feedback is admin-
istered implying that the participant made several mistakes. Questions are 
then repeated. 
Procedure and Instruction 
Participants arrived at the laboratory under the impression that they would 
be subjected to a computer test examining the influence of language on re-
action times. After giving informed consent, they had to complete some filler 
questionnaires. Next, they were told that they had to re-type words that 
were presented on the screen as fast as possible. They were also instructed 
not to hit the Alt-key, because this would cause the computer to crash. First, 
they had a practice trial. After the practice trial, half of the participants re-
ceived negative feedback, while the other half received no feedback. Partici-
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pants in the negative feedback conditions (condition 1 and 2) were asked if 
they could remember making any mistakes during the practice trial. Subse-
quently, they were shown a false print of the practice words containing sev-
eral mistakes. In addition, the experimenter commented that their recollec-
tions apparently were not as accurate as they had thought. After this feed-
back, the test trial started. Again, participants had to retype words that were 
presented on the computer screen. To make the computer crash plausible, 
the computer was programmed to crash during typing the word ‘success’. 
This happened immediately after typing the second ‘c’, a letter close to the 
Alt-key. The experimenter then accused the participants of having touched 
the Alt-key and asked them to sign a confession, stating that they were re-
sponsible for the computer crash. After the confession was signed (or not), 
the experimenter left the room supposedly to consult his supervisor on how 
to proceed. After a few minutes, a confederate entered the room with the 
excuse that he had to work on that specific computer. After the confederate 
discovered that the computer had crashed, he asked the participant what 
had happened. The confederate’s task was to find out whether the confes-
sion had been externalised (i.e., pressured-compliant false confession) or 
internalised (i.e., pressured-internalised false confession). After the confed-
erate had left the room, the experimenter returned. The GSS was adminis-
tered either before (condition 1 and 3) or after (condition 2 and 4) the com-
puter task. At the end of the experiment, all participants were debriefed. 
Results 
One participant (from condition 1) was excluded from further analysis, be-
cause he was familiar with the computer crash paradigm. 
M anipulation Check 
As a manipulation check, the differences between the pre- and post-test 
scores on the memory distrust item were evaluated with t-tests. As can be 
seen in Table 6.1, memory distrust increased significantly in conditions 1 and 
2 (both ps < .05). In condition 3, this increase was borderline significant (p = 
.07), whereas in the control condition it failed to reach significance (p = .71). 
The four conditions did not differ with respect to pre-test scores [F(3,75) = 
.20, p = .90] . 
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Table 6.1 
Mean Pre-Test and Post-Test Scores on the Memory Distrust Item (Standard 
Deviations are given in Parentheses), including t and Cohen’s d Values 
Condition n M pre-test M post-test t d 
1. Negative feedback & GSS 19 27.7 (16.1) 34.1 (15.4) 2.51* .40 
2. Negative feedback only 20 30.8 (23.2) 41.0 (22.3) 3.79* .45 
3. GSS only 20 29.9 (19.7) 36.8 (15.8) 1.91* .38 
4. Control 20 32.5 (19.0) 33.9 (15.4) .38 .08 
* p < .05 (one-tailed). 
False Confessions 
In total, 41 of the 79 participants (52%) falsely confessed. The 41 confessions 
consisted of 17 (41.5%) compliant and 24 (58.5%) internalised false confes-
sions. The four conditions did not differ with respect to overall confession 
rate [χ²(3, N = 79) = 2.56, p = .46] . Apparently, negative feedback (induced 
by bogus feedback and/or by the GSS) did not contribute to the total number 
of false confessions. However, the conditions did differ with respect to false 
confession type [χ²(3, N = 41) = 8.89, p = .03, Cramer’s V = .49] , with condi-
tions 1, 2, 3, and 4 involving 4, 4, 2, and 7 compliant false confessions and 4, 
7, 11, and 2 internalised false confessions, respectively. 
Follow-up comparisons indicated that it was not the presence or absence 
of negative bogus feedback about trial performance (conditions 1 & 2 vs. 
conditions 3 & 4) that was crucial for the group differences in false confes-
sion type [χ²(1, N = 41 = .01, p = .94] . Neither was the pre-test administra-
tion of the GSS versus post-test administration (conditions 1 & 3 vs. condi-
tions 2 & 4) critical [χ²(1, N = 41) = 2.95, p = .09] .10 Rather, it was the pres-
ence of any type of negative evaluation (conditions 1, 2, & 3 vs. condition 
4), that increased the proportion of internalised false confessions relative to 
the control condition [χ²(1, N = 41) = 6.27, p = .01, Cramer’s V = .39] . This 
is shown in Figure 6.1. 
 
 
                                                   
10 Logistic regression analyses revealed that none of the GSS parameters (i.e., Yield1, Yield2, 
Shift, and GSS total score) significantly predicted either false confession rate or type of false 
confession. 
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Figure 6.1. Proportion of compliant and internalised false confessions in the 
negative feedback conditions (1, 2, and 3) and the control condition (4). 
Discussion 
The results of the present study can be summarised as follows. First, half of 
our participants (52%) were willing to falsely confess to have caused a com-
puter crash and of these, 58.5% internalised their false confessions. Second, 
at first glance, participants who received negative evaluations either in the 
form of negative feedback on their practice trial performance, the GSS, or 
both, did not confess more often than participants who did not receive such 
evaluations. However, when looking specifically at the type of false confes-
sions, we found that any negative feedback prior to the computer crash led 
to an increase of internalised false confessions. 
The first finding is somewhat atypical in that our overall false confession 
rate is lower than that reported in earlier studies. Thus, in previous studies, 
false confession rates varied from 69% to 82% (Horselenberg et al., 2003; 
Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Perhaps, our students had more knowledge about 
computers and were more suspicious when dealing with crashed computers 
in psychological experiments. The rate of internalised false confessions, on 
the other hand, was higher than that reported in previous studies (i.e., be-
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tween 28% and 42%). There are good reasons to assume that this height-
ened frequency has to do with our memory distrust manipulation. It seems 
that negative feedback makes participants seriously doubt their recollections 
and renders them more vulnerable to internalise a false confession. Obvi-
ously, the levels of memory distrust in police interrogations can easily ex-
ceed those elicited in our study. We therefore suspect that the false confes-
sion effects of false feedback that we found are an underestimation of the 
effects in real-life situations. Combined with interrogative pressure, anxiety, 
and sleep deprivation, memory distrust may lead to even higher rates of false 
confessions. After all, false confessions seem to be more typical for serious 
crimes such as murder (Drizin & Leo, 2004). 
Our results show that participants exposed to negative feedback do not 
confess more often than people who received no feedback. However, nega-
tive feedback per se promotes pressured-internalised false confessions. This is 
what one would expect on theoretical grounds (i.e., that memory distrust 
fosters acceptance of misleading information; Gudjonsson et al., 1999) and it 
is in line with case studies and empirical research in this domain (Gudjons-
son, 2003; Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1982; Van Bergen et al., 2008). 
The present study has limitations that deserve some comment. First, one 
might of course question the ecological validity of the paradigm that we 
used. The computer crash paradigm has been criticised for not being ecologi-
cally valid, as it does not capture certain key elements of real-world interro-
gations and confessions (Inbau et al., 2001). On the other hand, it seems 
hardly impossible to design a false confession paradigm that does not go 
beyond the ethical standards. Also, the memory distrust levels induced by 
negative feedback are lower than levels experienced in interrogation set-
tings. In those settings, giving negative feedback is an often used strategy 
while interviewing suspects, for example, by calling the suspect a liar (Kas-
sin, 2005) or by repeating questions (Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 
1998). Still, that false confessions and memory distrust can be relatively eas-
ily induced in students (i.e., people who possess above average intelligence 
and are therefore rather confident in their memory) suggests that in real-life 
situations effects of memory distrust might be much more dramatic. 
In future research, a more ecologically valid false confession paradigm 
should be considered. An example within the field of memory distrust may 
be to falsely accuse people of being late for a meeting. It might also be inter-
esting to investigate the relationship between memory distrust and false 
confessions in other than student samples, such as community samples or 
patients who are known for being less confident in their own memory (e.g., 
people suffering from depression or ADHD). 
False confessions are not uncommon in the legal system and when they 
occur, they might have dramatic consequences (Davis & Loftus, 2006). Such 
CHAPTER 6 
92 
consequences might be especially likely when innocent suspects do not re-
tract their false confessions because they have come to believe them. As a 
result, research exploring the antecedents of such internalised false confes-
sions is highly relevant. The present findings show that memory distrust is 
one such antecedent. Therefore, interrogation officers should be reluctant in 
communicating to suspects that their memory is suboptimal. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on memory distrust, which is defined as “a condi-
tion where people develop a profound distrust of their memory recollections, 
as a result of which they are particularly susceptible to relying on external 
cues and suggestions” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 196). Memory distrust seems to 
manifest itself both within clinical and forensic settings and may have far-
reaching consequences. This was already noticed by Gudjonsson and col-
leagues (1999) who claimed that “a memory distrust syndrome makes some 
people susceptible to developing a false memory or confabulation” (p. 455). 
In the legal domain, the memory distrust syndrome has only been described 
in case studies. No experimental research has examined this concept and its 
consequences for the forensic field thoroughly. The present dissertation is a 
first attempt to develop a more systematic corpus of knowledge on memory 
distrust. 
Memory distrust can be divided into two types: trait memory distrust 
and state memory distrust. Both types may become relevant at different 
times during the interrogation process. Trait memory distrust is already pre-
sent in a person before he/she enters the interrogation room. State memory 
distrust, on the other hand, may arise during the interrogation, for example, 
as a result of psychological manipulations by police officers. One could argue 
that a combination of both trait memory distrust and interrogative pressure 
(leading to state memory distrust) may increase the psychological vulnerabil-
ity of the defendant tremendously.11 In some cases, this may result in false 
confessions. It should be noted that no empirical evidence has yet confirmed 
the assumptions that are pointed out in this paragraph. 
This thesis is divided into two parts; the first part addresses studies exam-
ining trait memory distrust (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), whereas the second part 
looks into state memory distrust (Chapters 5 and 6). In this concluding chap-
ter the main findings of the studies presented in this thesis will be discussed. 
Also, limitations and suggestions for future research as well as practical im-
plications will be formulated. 
                                                   
11 Note that each type of memory distrust individually may already increase a person’s vulner-
ability. 
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Summary of Empirical Findings 
M easuring Trait M emory Distrust 
Trait memory distrust refers to fundamental and habitual doubts that indi-
viduals have about their own memory functioning. In a legal setting, these 
doubts may have a large impact on the statements of suspects or eyewit-
nesses. Therefore, it is useful to develop a test that quantifies the degree of 
memory distrust. Although there are many tests that assess objective mem-
ory performance (e.g., AVLT; Rey, 1964), the number of instruments that 
focus specifically on subjective memory performance is limited. And most of 
the existing questionnaires are not useful for measuring trait memory dis-
trust, for example, because they focus merely on prospective aspects of 
memory (e.g., PRMQ; Smith et al., 2000), or because they are not concise 
enough (e.g., MIA; Dixon & Hultsch, 1983). 
This does not apply to the adapted Dutch version of the Squire Subjec-
tive Memory Questionnaire (Van Bergen, 2008; Van Bergen et al., 2010a). 
The validation study described in Chapter 2 shows that the SSMQ is a psy-
chometrically sound instrument that can be helpful in assessing subjective 
memory evaluation, both in the clinical and the forensic domain. People 
who often doubt their memory will be most likely to evaluate their memory 
in a negative way. Therefore, a low score on the SSMQ can be seen as an 
indication of trait memory distrust. Because this one-dimensional question-
naire is shown to be reliable and valid, it can be used to identify vulnerable 
suspects and/or eyewitnesses in an early stage.12 The statements of these 
individuals should be interpreted cautiously and the level of interrogative 
pressure should be adjusted to accord with the degree of memory distrust. 
Ideally, this will diminish the frequency of false confessions or false state-
ments. 
Related Concepts of M emory Distrust 
The various chapters of this dissertation examined several concepts that 
were expected to relate to memory distrust (as measured by the SSMQ) 
based on forensic cases and psychogeriatric studies (Commissaris et al., 1998; 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Gudjonsson et al., 1999; Merckelbach & Muris, 2008). 
Although some relationships are not as straightforward as anticipated, most 
                                                   
12 Note that this vulnerability only pertains to poor memory, and not to other vulnerabilities 
often mentioned in the literature, such as mental disorders, abnormal mental states, poor intel-
lectual functioning, and personality disorders (Gudjonsson, 2010). 
CHAPTER 7 
96 
findings are robust. First, trait memory distrust correlates positively with 
cognitive failures (i.e., everyday lapses in memory, attention, and action; 
Broadbent et al., 1982). That is, the more one suffers from memory distrust, 
the more cognitive failures one reports. Second, age and memory distrust are 
also closely related, with older individuals exhibiting more memory distrust. 
Other variables such as objective memory performance, depression, and 
compliance correlate with memory distrust in the expected directions. How-
ever, these correlations do not always reach significance. As for actual mem-
ory performance, Chapter 2 showed that people who are confident in their 
memory also perform better on a memory task. Furthermore, it was shown 
that depression and compliance are both negatively linked to trait memory 
distrust. In other words, individuals who evaluate their own memory nega-
tively are also more likely to score high on depression and are more compli-
ant than persons scoring high (i.e., positive) on the SSMQ. Despite the fact 
that these links were not significant in all subsamples described in Chapter 2, 
the overall pattern changed when the relevant subsamples were collapsed. 
After combining these samples, subjective memory evaluation correlated 
significantly with objective memory (n = 182; r = .31; p < .001),13 depression 
(n = 492; r = -.27, p < .001),14 and compliance (n = 214; r = -.19, p = .006).15 
In sum, trait memory distrust as measured by the SSMQ goes along with an 
older age, more cognitive failures, poor objective memory performance, 
more depression, and more compliance. 
Meanwhile, the study presented in Chapter 3 failed to show that mem-
ory distrust (as measured with the SSMQ) relates to higher levels of sug-
gestibility and false memories. This is striking because case studies suggest 
that these three concepts are closely related (Gudjonsson, 2003). Our nega-
tive result might have to do with the fact that the type of memory distrust 
that we measured in Chapter 3 was trait-like by nature, whereas the case 
studies describe state memory distrust. Also, the false memory paradigm that 
we used, the DRM task, might not have been the most appropriate test to 
study false memories as such. Although the debate whether the DRM illu-
sion can be generalised to autobiographic memories is still ongoing (Freyd & 
Gleaves, 1996; Otgaar & Candel, in press; Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Roediger & McDermott, 1996), a recent literature review (Gallo, 2010) pro-
vides substantial empirical evidence to assume that the DRM illusion is re-
                                                   
13 When we collapsed data across samples and excluded outliers, the correlation remained 
significant (n = 199; r =.29, p < .001). 
14 Idem, n = 510; r = -.24, p < .001. 
15 Idem, n = 214; r = -.19, p = .006. Since there were no outliers, both in the separate samples 
and in the collapsed samples, the total number of participants corresponds to the sum of the 
separate samples. 
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lated to autobiographical memory distortions in settings outside the lab. Still, 
with regard to Chapter 3, a suggestion-induced paradigm might have been a 
better option than the DRM paradigm to examine the relationship between 
memory distrust and false memories, since it resembles real interrogation 
situations more closely. 
M isinformation 
Chapter 4 elaborates on the issue of how memory distortions and suggesti-
bility can best be measured. This study was undertaken to overcome the 
limitations of the study described in Chapter 3. This time, a more realistic 
environment was created to test memory distrust in the way that it emerges 
in the justice system. To achieve this, we adopted some procedures that are 
commonly employed by the police, such as taking down the testimony 
(Malsch, Haket, & Nijboer, 2008). We also used another paradigm to test 
false memories, namely the misinformation paradigm (Loftus, 2005; Loftus 
& Palmer, 1974). In our experiment, we added information to the testimony 
of a witness who had seen video footage of a simulated robbery. 
The findings of this study showed that individuals who suffer from trait 
memory distrust are more prone to accept misinformation than persons who 
are very confident in their memory. In other words, people suffering from 
memory distrust are more suggestible and therefore more likely to create 
false memories than those low on memory distrust. This contradicts the find-
ings of Chapter 3 in which we did not find a significant relationship between 
memory distrust, suggestibility, and false memories. We argue that the find-
ings in Chapter 4 carry more weight than those in Chapter 3 as these were 
obtained with a more ecologically valid paradigm. 
Surprisingly, this study also showed that individuals who are very confi-
dent in their memory more often reject accurate information of their testi-
mony. In other words, being very confident in your memory is no safeguard 
for making mistakes. However, when the effect size of this result is taken 
into account, it should be acknowledged that this effect is rather trivial. Fur-
thermore, this finding is easy to explain by the fact that people suffering 
from memory distrust were probably less likely to express their doubts about 
the misinformation and the accurate information, whereas memory confi-
dent persons have a rather critical way of dealing with both outcome vari-
ables. 
Interrogation Techniques 
The second part of this thesis addressed state memory distrust, which is the 
type of memory distrust that is predominantly reported in forensic case vi-
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gnettes. Chapter 5 examined whether memory distrust could be elicited by 
interrogation techniques that are hypothesised to cause false confessions. 
Because there are numerous interrogation techniques, we selected those 
that were most likely to evoke memory distrust (i.e., false technical evi-
dence, false eyewitness evidence, maximising, minimising, and suggesting 
memory problems). Furthermore, we were interested in the relationship 
between memory distrust and the tendency to falsely confess. In this ex-
periment, undergraduate students were accused of exam fraud. After the 
accusation, they had to imagine several situations and had to indicate their 
tendency to distrust their memory and their tendency to falsely confess. 
These situations consisted of descriptions of the above mentioned interroga-
tion techniques. 
This study confirmed that state memory distrust correlates positively 
with the tendency to falsely confess. However, the interrogation techniques 
did not have a uniform effect on both concepts (i.e., memory distrust and 
false confessions). More specifically, suggesting memory problems had the 
largest impact on memory distrust, whereas false technical evidence made 
people most willingly to falsely confess. Also, this study showed that mem-
ory distrust is not always a static phenomenon; individuals fluctuate in the 
extent to which they are inclined to distrust their memory. This is another 
illustration of the existence of two different types of memory distrust (i.e., 
trait and state memory distrust). Because this study relied on a thought ex-
periment, no conclusions could be drawn about the causal relationship be-
tween memory distrust and false confessions. However, it is plausible to 
assume that memory distrust precedes false confessions rather than vice 
versa. 
False Confessions 
The study described in Chapter 6 addressed the issue of causality. Using the 
computer crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), we accused undergradu-
ate students of hitting a computer key which they were not allowed to 
touch. A group of participants had been manipulated into a state of memory 
distrust. In this way it was possible to examine the effect of memory distrust 
on false confession rates. The findings can be summarised as follows. First of 
all, we were successful in evoking memory distrust by giving participants 
negative bogus feedback. Second, more than half of the participants (52%) 
falsely confessed to being responsible for the computer to crash, and of 
these, 58.5% internalised their confession. Third, the overall confession rate 
was not influenced by lowered memory confidence. However, when taking 
the type of false confession into account, findings show that participants 
with elevated state memory distrust (induced by any type of negative feed-
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back prior to the computer test) internalised their false confessions more 
often than participants who had not received negative feedback. This study, 
therefore, shows that memory distrust may be an antecedent of internalised 
false confessions. 
New Classification of False Confessions 
Applying the findings from Chapter 6 to the modified taxonomy of false 
confessions proposed by Gudjonsson (2003) suggests that this refinement of 
the original model of Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) is not optimal. While it 
is useful to classify the source of pressure and change the term coerced into 
pressured, as Gudjonsson (2003) did, the specific classification of sources 
might be reformulated so as to be more precise. Therefore, the following 
taxonomy is proposed. 
Table 7.1 
New Taxonomy for Classifying False Confessions  
Type of false confession Source of pressure 
1. Voluntary Internal  
2. Pressured-compliant Internal / Custodial / Non-custodial  
3. Pressured-internalised Internal / Custodial / Non-custodial 
 
Compared to the scheme proposed by Gudjonsson (2003; see also Table 1.1 
of Chapter 1), this taxonomy elaborates on the sources of the pressured 
types of false confessions. We agree with Gudjonsson that voluntary false 
confessions only result from internal pressure. However, in light of the find-
ings presented in Chapter 6, one might conclude that both pressured-
internalised and pressured-compliant false confessions may also result from 
internal pressure. Although Gudjonsson literally writes that “even when the 
confession results from external pressure there may also be an element of 
internal pressure to confess falsely” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 211), he failed to 
consider internal pressure into the pressured types of false confessions in his 
modified taxonomy. The findings of Chapter 6, however, show that memory 
distrust promotes the development of internalised false confessions. Often, 
memory distrust will be evoked by custodial or non-custodial pressure (e.g., 
police interrogations), but it is also possible that it is present in a person 
without the existence of external circumstances. In any case, memory dis-
trust is an internal process in which a person has doubts about his/her own 
recollections. As a result, s/he experiences an internal struggle and tries to 
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resolve the tension s/he feels. This causes internal pressure. The importance 
of internal pressure should therefore not be dismissed and should be in-
cluded in the modified framework. 
Conceptual Critique 
As stated earlier, Gudjonsson defines the memory distrust syndrome as “a 
condition where people develop a profound distrust of their memory recol-
lections, as a result of which they are particularly susceptible to relying on 
external cues and suggestions” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 196). This definition is 
problematic for several reasons. To begin with, it describes a phenomenon in 
terms of its outcome. From a scientific point of view this is questionable, 
because it invites circular reasoning and hypotheses that run the risk of be-
coming difficult to falsify. Consider the analogy with a disease (e.g., can-
cer) that includes the outcome (e.g., death) in its definition. Whenever death 
does not occur, one cannot argue anymore that the patient has cancer. In 
other words, based on the definition one has to argue that it was a different 
type of disease. Thus, with this in mind, it would be wiser to define memory 
distrust only by its symptoms. Specifically, this would imply that the subor-
dinate clause (“as a result …  cues and suggestions”) should be left out.  
The second reason why the definition is problematic is that there is no a 
priori reason to assume that memory distrust invariably promotes the accep-
tance of misinformation. For example, Hekkanen and McEvoy (2002) ar-
gued that memory distrust might make people reluctant to accept any type 
of information. By this view, memory distrust makes individuals hypercriti-
cal, the precise opposite of what Gudjonsson’s definition implies. Since the 
definition of memory distrust is solely based on forensic case studies, it 
would be wise to extensively examine whether individuals with memory 
distrust are more prone to accept misinformation or whether they adopt a 
more critical attitude. The study described in Chapter 4 was the first one to 
examine this issue and confirmed Gudjonsson’s line of reasoning. Note how-
ever, that the data described in Chapter 3 of this dissertation provide an em-
pirical demonstration of memory distrust without raised levels of suggestibil-
ity. Apparently, the association between memory distrust and suggestibility 
and/or acceptance of misinformation is not clear-cut. More studies should be 
undertaken to examine this relationship. This could lead to a reformulation 
of the definition of memory distrust as proposed by Gudjonsson. 
There is another conceptual issue that warrants comment. Gudjons-
son presented memory distrust as a free standing concept, but the results of 
the studies in Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate that memory distrust and cognitive 
failures overlap to a considerable degree. This raises the question whether 
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there might be an overarching factor or variable that might encompass re-
lated concepts such as memory distrust, depression, cognitive failures, etc. 
Interestingly, it was Gudjonsson himself who in older articles stressed the 
significance of low self-esteem. Gudjonsson and Lister (1984) argued that 
interrogators who attempt to undermine suspects’ or witnesses’ self-esteem 
or self-confidence may make them particularly prone to misleading sugges-
tions. Likewise, Singh and Gudjonsson (1984) contended that self-esteem 
interacts with the unfamiliarity of the interrogation context such that sus-
pects or eyewitnesses low in self-esteem become more vulnerable to misin-
formation. Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2003, p. 122) wrote that “Persons 
with low self-esteem are vulnerable to giving in to pressure from others, 
because of their eagerness to please and the accompanying reluctance to 
engage in confrontation with people.” The issue is important because one 
could argue that as long as memory distrust does not co-occur with low self- 
esteem, as might be the case in what we term state memory distrust, it does 
not result in heightened suggestibility or compliance. 
M ethodological Remarks 
In this section, a general overview is presented of the methodological limita-
tions that were encountered during the studies described in the current dis-
sertation. One of the main problems was figuring out whether participants 
really experienced memory distrust. In the studies that examined trait mem-
ory distrust, we could not test this independently, and therefore had to rely 
on self-reports. We also had to assume that persons who evaluate their 
memory as poor base this judgement on their habitual memory doubts. It 
might well be that some of these individuals only suffered from a specific 
type of memory distrust (e.g., forgetting names or faces), or based their 
evaluation on feedback from others. This made it difficult to create distinc-
tive homogeneous groups and therefore less likely to find striking results 
when comparing two memory groups (i.e., memory confidence and memory 
distrust, respectively) on an outcome variable, such as suggestibility or false 
memories. 
In the studies which examined state memory distrust, the main problem 
was to develop a successful manipulation and a realistic design. One can 
only conclude that a manipulation has been successful with a valid manipu-
lation check. This is complicated by the fact that most studies do not reveal 
the real purpose at the beginning of the experiment. As a result, the ma-
nipulation check cannot be made too explicit. Most of the times, the ma-
nipulation check consisted of a memory evaluation that participants gave 
twice (i.e., before and after the manipulation). The difference between both 
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measurements and between groups indicated whether the manipulation had 
been successful. This could lead to the following potential problem, namely 
that the manipulation did work but that this was not captured correctly by 
the specific question, leading to a wrongful conclusion that the manipulation 
failed, while in fact the check was not reliable. 
Apart from the manipulation, the overall design of the studies had to be 
realistic and at the same time not too coercive, because this would raise ethi-
cal concerns. In this way, several of the original plans were rejected by the 
standing ethical committee of our Faculty because these experiments ac-
cepted the risk of putting intolerable pressure on participants. The down-
scaled designs we used had negative consequences for generalising the ob-
tained results to the police practice. Obviously, the levels of memory distrust 
(and other types of stress-induction) in real police interrogations exceed 
those elicited in our studies. We anticipate that the results found in our lab 
studies can therefore be seen as an underestimation of the effects in real-life 
situations. 
Another problem was the recruitment of participants. Although the first 
searches for community samples were fruitful, later efforts met with great 
difficulty to find new people who were interested in participating. This sub-
stantial decrease of community samples willing to volunteer in our research 
and the high costs that testing community samples requires, made it impos-
sible to conduct our research solely with persons from the community. 
Therefore, it became inevitable to ask undergraduate students to participate 
in our studies. It could be argued that this compromised the ecological valid-
ity of our experiments, because a more or less homogeneous student group 
is not representative for individuals who suffer from trait memory distrust. 
However, there is evidence showing that undergraduate students behave in 
the same way as prison inmates and community samples with regard to false 
confessions (Horselenberg et al., 2007). To solve this potential problem as 
much as possible, we conducted the research on trait memory distrust with 
community samples, and the state memory distrust research with under-
graduate students. As forensic case vignettes have already shown that even 
healthy, intelligent individuals are vulnerable to develop state memory dis-
trust (see case vignette 2; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2010), we anticipated 
that the approach taken in this dissertation would be justified. Moreover, 
one could argue that when memory distrust can be demonstrated among 
students (i.e., highly intelligent persons), this implies that the effects ob-
tained would be even larger in the general population, and especially among 
vulnerable people, such as juveniles, mentally ill patients, and individuals 
suffering from developmental disorders (e.g., ADHD; Gudjonsson et al., 
2007). 
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A final issue that should be noted in this section is the difficulty of mak-
ing the distinction between trait memory distrust and state memory distrust. 
In our studies, we aimed at examining these two types of memory distrust 
separately. As we did not put any stress on the participants who were in-
volved in the trait memory distrust research (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), we as-
sumed that the findings of these studies reflect trait memory distrust. The 
same applies to the studies that involved state memory distrust (Chapters 5 
and 6). In these studies we chose to rely on undergraduate students. These 
participants are intelligent and, as a rule, do not suffer from trait memory 
distrust (see relatively high mean SSMQ total scores). However, we cannot 
entirely rule out that there were instances in which both types of memory 
distrust were present in some participants. An example of this is described in 
Chapter 3, when persons scoring high on trait memory distrust underwent 
the GSS and the negative feedback it implied. The presence of both types of 
memory distrust is undesirable for experimental research in which you want 
to control all factors as much as possible. However, it should not have any 
negative consequences for generalising the findings to real-life situations, 
because in practice it is also likely that suspects suffer from both types of 
memory distrust. For example, a suspect who enters the interrogation room 
may already have serious doubts about his recollections (i.e., trait memory 
distrust), and will later be confronted with interrogation techniques eliciting 
state memory distrust. 
Directions for Future Research 
Repeated Questioning 
Over the last few years, memory distrust has been extensively researched in 
the field of the Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD; Boschen & Vuksano-
vic, 2007; Coles, Radomsky, & Horng, 2006; Dek, Van den Hout, Giele, & 
Engelhard, 2010; Harkin & Kessler, 2009; Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010; Ra-
domsky, Gilchrist, & Dussault, 2006; Van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Van den Hout, Engelhard, De Boer, Du Bois, & Dek, 2008). These 
studies focus on one of the two main characteristics of OCD, namely com-
pulsive behaviour, and more specifically, repeated checking. Overall, the 
studies in this domain employed the following design. Individuals are asked 
to turn on thee out of six gas stoves/ lamps,16 to turn them off, and to check 
whether they have correctly turned them off. Subsequently, a pre-test is 
                                                   
16 This happens either during a computer animation or in reality. 
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used to assess their accuracy and metamemory beliefs (i.e., liveliness, details, 
and memory confidence). Then, they are instructed to repeatedly check ei-
ther relevant or irrelevant controls (i.e., experimental vs. control group, 
respectively). The relevant controls are the same objects as participants used 
initially, while the irrelevant controls are different objects than the original 
ones (e.g., lamps instead of gas stoves, and vice versa). Finally, they are all 
given a post-test which corresponds with the pre-test. Findings show that 
both groups are equally accurate in remembering which gas stoves/ lamps 
they had turned on. However, the experimental group shows a decrease on 
all three aspects of metamemory: liveliness, details, and memory confidence. 
In other words, compared to the control group, the experimental partici-
pants report less lively and less detailed memories and less memory confi-
dence on the post-test (Van den Hout, 2010). In sum, repeated checking not 
only originates from, but also causes, memory distrust. This robust effect has 
been demonstrated in samples of both patients and healthy individuals. 
The experimental paradigms that are used in these studies may be appli-
cable to the forensic field as well. During police interrogations, questions are 
often repeated and answered. This resembles the repetitive procedure that is 
described in the OCD literature. By repeating the questions, an interrogator 
implicitly gives the impression that the suspect or witness is mistaken and 
that their memories are incorrect.17 This is an ideal breeding ground for 
memory distrust (Van Bergen, 2009a). Therefore, the OCD literature might 
provide us with a new, ecologically valid paradigm to investigate (legal) 
memory distrust in the lab. 
So far, two pilot studies have been conducted in our lab with this para-
digm. We examined the influence of repeated questioning on memory dis-
trust in an interrogative setting. At first sight, it might seem simple to trans-
late the OCD procedure to the forensic field. However, we discovered that 
the practical implementation is rather complex. For example, repeating the 
same question many times is not very realistic over a short time period, es-
pecially when the participants are not informed about the real purpose of 
the experiment. 
In our first pilot study, we examined whether repeated questioning in-
duced memory distrust. In this experiment, 44 undergraduate students par-
ticipated. They had to choose one of two envelopes and were told that they 
had to act according to an ‘innocent’ or a ‘guilty’ scenario. Next, they had to 
go to a lab that was decorated as a bar. In this lab, a male dummy was situ-
ated on the ground. The envelopes were manipulated in a way that all par-
                                                   
17 Besides this, suspects are often also explicitly accused of lying (Inbau et al., 2001; Kassin et 
al., 2010). 
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ticipants received the innocent scenario (i.e., they had to check the dummy’s 
wallet, but they were not allowed to steal it). However, they were under the 
impression that they also could have received the guilty scenario instruction 
(i.e., that they had to steal the dummy’s wallet). In this way, it would be 
logical that they would be interrogated about, and possibly be accused of, 
stealing the wallet. During a subsequent interrogation, both relevant and 
irrelevant questions were asked. The relevant questions consisted of details 
of the bar and the wallet. Half of the participants had to answer the relevant 
questions four times18 altogether (i.e., experimental condition, n = 22), while 
the other half had to answer them only once and received many irrelevant 
questions (i.e., control condition, n = 22). 
The main outcome measure of this study was the way the participants 
evaluated their memory on the post-test (compared to the pre-test). Findings 
indicated that there were no differences between the two groups in the way 
they evaluated their memory [ t(42) = .80, p = .43] . One explanation for this 
may be that the number of repetitions was not sufficient. Coles and co-
authors (2006) have claimed that more repetitions lead to a larger effect. A 
significant increase is reached after more than five repetitions. But other 
research has shown that memory distrust can already be evoked after two 
and five repetitions (Van den Hout, 2010). Furthermore, we also assessed 
whether persons who changed their answers, judged their memory as worse 
on the post-test. It appeared that shifting answers and memory evaluation 
correlated borderline significantly (r = -.39, p = .08). More specifically, the 
more participants changed their answers, the poorer they judged their mem-
ory on the post-test (compared to the pre-test). 
The second pilot study also examined the effect of repeated interroga-
tions on memory confidence (Kraasch, 2009). Undergraduate students (N = 
50) received the same instruction as was given in the first pilot study. This 
time, the interrogation part was set up differently. When the participants 
returned to the test room, they were asked to give a full written report about 
the situation they had encountered in the bar lab. Following this, the ex-
perimental group (n = 25) was instructed to verbally recall the situation for 
another five times. Note that, compared to the first pilot study, the number 
of repetitions was increased (i.e., six recall trials in the experimental group 
instead of four). They were given five cues to help them remember (i.e., 
entry, bar, dummy, envelope, leaving). The control group (n = 25) had to 
repeatedly recall an irrelevant event (i.e., their journey from home to the 
lab). Subsequently, all participants were given a cued recall task consisting of 
                                                   
18 To keep the design as realistic as possible, the 10 relevant questions that were repeated four 
times, were alternated with an equal number of irrelevant questions (i.e., 40) and were para-
phrased each time so that the real purpose of the experiment would not become too obvious.  
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30 items. They also gave confidence estimates for each question on a 7-point 
Likert scale (anchors: 1 = ‘totally not confident’; 7 = ‘totally confident’). 
The results indicated that repetition lead to confidence inflation, rather 
than deflation [ t(48) = 1.99, p = .05] . In other words, the experimental 
group (M  = 5.67, SD = .71) was more confident than the control group (M  = 
5.21, SD = .90). Note that this difference, in absolute terms, consists of less 
than .5 on a 7-point Likert scale. Furthermore, no group differences were 
found on the objective memory parameters (i.e., cued recall and recogni-
tion). However, findings reflect an intact confidence-accuracy relationship. 
Specifically, more correct cued recall co-varied with more confidence in both 
the experimental and control group (r = .39, p = .05, and r = .62, p = .001, 
respectively). 
These two pilot studies show that memory distrust is apparently more 
difficult (or even impossible) to trigger when using (repetitions of) questions 
instead of actions (which were used in the OCD-studies). An explanation of 
our null results may be that the number of repetitions was too small to ob-
tain a confidence deflating effect. However, increasing the number of repeti-
tions more than six times would seriously undermine the credibility of the 
lab experiment, and therefore the outcomes. In real life, on the other hand, 
it is quite realistic that suspects are repeatedly asked the same questions, 
over the course of several interrogation sessions. Most of the time, this oc-
curs if the suspect’s answers do not correspond to the expectations of the 
interrogators. People often report getting hesitant when they are asked the 
same question again and change their answers. Evidence for this has been 
found for suspects and witnesses (both children and adults) who are ques-
tioned during lengthy interrogations (Garven et al., 1998; Krähenbühl, 
Blades, & Eiser, 2009; Odinot, Wolters, & Van Giezen, 2008). In other words, 
these repetitions induce confidence deflation, or memory distrust. However, 
under some conditions, repeated questioning can also lead to perseverance 
and thus confidence inflation (Odinot & Wolters, 2006; Odinot, Wolters, & 
Lavender, 2009; Shaw & McClure, 1996). 
Another scenario would be that police officers continue to repeat ques-
tions because the suspect or witness is very hesitant and self-doubting.19 
Here, repeated questioning does not cause memory distrust, but results from 
memory distrust. Also, it is quite likely that a combination of factors contrib-
utes to the elicitation of memory distrust. Consider, for example, stress, sleep 
deprivation, and personality factors (e.g., low self-esteem) that affect related 
concepts such as suggestibility (Gudjonsson, 2003). If this broad range of 
factors is taken into account, it is not so remarkable that both pilot studies 
                                                   
19 Here, we are dealing with trait instead of state memory distrust. 
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resulted in null findings. It would, however, still be interesting to pursue this 
line of research to see if we can find experimental evidence for evoking 
memory distrust through repeated questioning. 
Other interesting issues to explore are whether it is the mere repetition 
of questions, the repeated retrieval of information from memory, or repeat-
edly answering questions, that leads to memory distrust. It might be that the 
first option per se does not undermine memory distrust, but the other two 
do. In sum, there is still much to be researched in this field. This is all the 
more true as most of the research on repeated questioning has been per-
formed with children and only few studies have examined its consequences 
among adults. 
Another approach to examine the influence of repetition is the follow-
ing. In police practice, suspects and witnesses are often encouraged to imag-
ine what could have happened at a crime scene. In such situations, repeti-
tion of events also comes into play. Studies have already shown that imagin-
ing an event can be very powerful and sometimes may even lead to false 
confessions (Horselenberg, De Zutter, & Van Bergen, 2010). This may pro-
vide us with an interesting and ecologically valid version of the repeated 
questioning paradigm. In such a paradigm, participants are instructed to 
imagine about a scenario of what could have happened. As a result they 
might start to distrust their memory.20 Memory distrust makes them more 
vulnerable to making source monitoring errors, which could eventually lead 
to false statements or confessions. This line of research is still in its infancy, 
but might be a fascinating field to explore in the future. 
Amnesia 
Chapter 1 stated two conditions under which the memory distrust syndrome 
may occur (Gudjonsson, 2003). This thesis, however, has not focused on 
situations in which individuals have no clear memory of a specific event due 
to head injury or substance abuse (e.g., excessive alcohol use; Van Oorsouw, 
Merckelbach, Ravelli, Nijman, & Pompen, 2004). This type of memory loss is 
called organic amnesia (Kopelman, 2002). Organic amnesia may be perma-
nent, in case of structural brain damage, but can also be transient by nature, 
in case of substance abuse, or mild traumatic head injury. Amnesic individu-
als may be a very interesting new group to study in future memory distrust 
research. 
                                                   
20 OCD research has already provided evidence that mental checking, comparable to imagina-
tion, leads to memory distrust (Radomsky & Alcolado, 2010). 
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Practical Implications 
Forensic Practice 
Although vulnerable suspects and eyewitnesses are often described in the 
forensic literature, it remains unclear why these individuals give a false con-
fession or a false statement (Gudjonsson, 2010). Based on this dissertation, it 
may be assumed that memory distrust may be (part of) the answer to this 
question. Legal psychologists who advise the police on how to interrogate 
suspects and eyewitness should be aware of the influence of memory dis-
trust. In this way, experts can identify memory distrust early in the interro-
gation process, which warrants the fairness of the investigation.  
Many cases are known in which vulnerable persons suffering from 
memory distrust are convicted for crimes they did not commit (e.g., Gud-
jonsson et al., 1999; Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, 2010). Also in these cases, 
expert witnesses can make a difference by giving psychological evidence 
(e.g., during an appeal). The focus of these psychological evaluations should 
be on the strengths and weaknesses (i.e., vulnerabilities) of the wit-
ness/suspect, which may have bearing on the reliability of the evidence 
(Gudjonsson, 2006). Sometimes these evaluations may provide a legal basis 
for exoneration. 
The term memory distrust syndrome actually stems from these types of 
psychological evaluations. Psychologists are often tempted to easily term a 
new phenomenon a syndrome. Examples are the false memory syndrome 
(Freyd & Taub, 1999) and the amnesic syndrome (Kopelman, 2002). One 
could argue though, that the memory distrust syndrome is not truly a syn-
drome. A syndrome implies a fixed constellation of symptoms and a clear 
aetiology which often has a medical connotation. This is, however, not ap-
plicable to all the forensic cases that have described suspects suffering from 
memory distrust. In most of these cases, memory distrust is a situational 
phenomenon rather than a syndrome. Therefore, one should be careful with 
using terms such as ‘syndrome’, as it may give the impression that it is a rare 
phenomenon from which normal healthy individuals will not suffer. It goes 
without saying, that this is obviously not the case for memory distrust. 
Clinical Practice 
Although this dissertation mainly focuses on the legal field, some of the find-
ings can easily be translated to clinical practice. First of all, the SSMQ may 
prove to be useful in clinical practice. It may provide psychologists in the 
field with an instrument that assesses the subjective beliefs that individuals 
have about their own memory functioning. It may also give clinicians insight 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
109 
in whether people’s own beliefs differ from reality. For example, some older 
persons may believe that they have poor memory, while in reality their 
memory functions well. The results of the questionnaire may give practitio-
ners an entry to address the unrealistic beliefs their patients have. 
Furthermore, the results of Chapters 4 and 6 imply that psychotherapists 
should be careful when treating patients with psychological problems who 
do not feel very confident in their memory. These patients will be vulnerable 
to incorporate suggestions from others (e.g., the therapist) into their own 
story. In some cases, this may lead to source monitoring errors, in which the 
patients mistake these suggestions for authentic memories. Another lesson 
that can be drawn from this thesis is that therapists should be cautious with 
any negative feedback that they provide, since it may induce memory dis-
trust. The phenomena documented in Chapters 4 and 6 may have far-
reaching consequences. For example, patients may come to believe that they 
experienced a trauma (e.g., kidnapping, sexual abuse, murder) in their 
childhood, while in reality they have not. In some of these cases, this may 
result in false accusations of innocent individuals (Loftus & Davis, 2006). 
Closing Remarks 
This dissertation is a first experimental attempt to examine memory distrust 
in the legal arena. It provides an overview of related concepts of memory 
distrust, its consequences and possible ways to test it. Furthermore, it also 
stresses the difficulties that emerge in the lab when examining phenomena 
that have only been described in case studies. Despite these limitations, it 
has provided us with some guidelines on how to address individuals with 
memory distrust in a legal situation. First, it is useful to get an impression of 
a person’s memory doubts at the start of an interrogation. The SSMQ is a 
simple and efficient instrument to assess memory distrust. Second, police 
officers should be cautious when using interrogative pressure and negative 
feedback since this may elicit memory distrust, which in some cases may 
have serious consequences, such as internalised false confessions. Third, 
persons who are suffering from memory distrust may be prone to confuse 
misinformation for authentic information. Therefore, police interrogators 
should refrain from providing suspects with information that is false or un-
known to the suspect, and that later can be misinterpreted as guilty knowl-
edge by police officers. When these guidelines are considered in the future, it 
will be less likely that innocent individuals such as Andrew Evans (case vi-
gnette 1, p. 8) and Mr A (case vignette 2, p. 9) will falsely confess and ulti-
mately will be convicted. 
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The current dissertation addresses the concept of memory distrust in the 
legal context. Memory distrust can be defined as “a condition where people 
develop a profound distrust of their memory recollections, as a result of 
which they are particularly susceptible to relying on external cues and sug-
gestions” (Gudjonsson, 2003, p. 196). Memory distrust can be encountered 
both in clinical and forensic settings. Especially in the legal setting, it may 
have far-reaching consequences. The memory distrust syndrome has only 
been described in forensic case studies. The present dissertation is a first at-
tempt to develop a more systematic corpus of knowledge about memory 
distrust in the legal domain. 
Chapter 1 presents two case vignettes of false confessions in which 
memory distrust played an important role. This chapter gives an overview of 
false memory and false confession research in which the memory distrust 
syndrome was firstly described. It also addresses other areas in which mem-
ory distrust is a common phenomenon (i.e., psychogeriatrics and the Obses-
sive-Compulsive Disorder). The following research questions are formulated 
and will be elaborated in the following chapters: What is memory distrust? 
What are related concepts of memory distrust? How can memory distrust be 
measured best? Are individuals suffering from memory distrust susceptible 
to developing false memories and/or false confessions? 
This dissertation is divided into two parts; the first part addresses studies 
that examine trait memory distrust (Chapters 2, 3, and 4). This type of 
memory distrust manifests itself in people who have habitual memory 
doubts. The second part looks into state memory distrust, a temporary state 
in which individuals develop doubts about their memory (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Chapter 2 describes a validation study of the Dutch adapted version of 
the Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ) that can be used to 
assess trait memory distrust. The SSMQ proves to be a psychometrically 
sound instrument. In the forensic setting, it can be used to identify vulner-
able suspects in an early stage. As a result, the level of interrogative pressure 
can be adjusted to the suspect’s level of memory distrust. Ideally, this will 
diminish the frequency of false confessions. 
To increase our understanding of memory distrust, we examined several 
concepts that were expected to relate to trait memory distrust in Chapter 2, 
3, and 4. It can be concluded that trait memory distrust goes along with 
more cognitive failures (i.e., everyday lapses in memory, attention, and ac-
tion) and a higher age. Furthermore, it appears that persons who distrust 
their memory perform more poorly on objective memory measures than 
controls. And most of the time, they are also more depressed and more com-
pliant than individuals who are confident in their memory. 
Contrary to our expectations, Chapter 3 failed to find that memory dis-
trust relates to higher levels of suggestibility and false memories. This null-
SUMMARY 
127 
result might have to do with the fact that the type of memory distrust that 
we measured in this chapter was trait-like by nature, whereas all case studies 
referring to this relationship emphasise state memory distrust. Also, the false 
memory paradigm that we used, the DRM task, might not have been the 
most appropriate test to study false memories as such. 
The study described in Chapter 4 therefore used a suggestion-induced 
paradigm to elicit false memories. As the name of this paradigm implies, it 
involves suggestions. The findings of this study show that individuals who 
suffer from trait memory distrust are more prone to accept misinformation 
than persons who are very confident in their memory. In other words, peo-
ple suffering from memory distrust are more suggestible and therefore are 
more likely to create false memories. This contradicts the findings of Chapter 
3. We think that the findings in Chapter 4 carry more weight than those in 
the former chapter as they were obtained with a more ecologically valid 
paradigm. 
So far, the studies in this dissertation focused solely on trait memory dis-
trust. The two chapters that follow concentrate on state memory distrust. 
Chapter 5 examined whether memory distrust could be elicited by interroga-
tion techniques that have the potential of causing false confessions. Also, the 
relationship between memory distrust and the tendency to falsely confess 
was explored. This study confirmed that state memory distrust correlates 
positively with the tendency to falsely confess. However, the interrogation 
techniques did not have a uniform effect on both concepts (i.e., memory 
distrust and false confessions). More specifically, suggesting memory prob-
lems had the largest impact on memory distrust, whereas false technical 
evidence made individuals most willing to falsely confess. Because this study 
relied on a thought experiment, no conclusions could be drawn about the 
causal relationship between memory distrust and false confessions. 
Chapter 6 presents a study that aimed to clarify this issue of causality. 
Using the computer crash paradigm (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996), we accused 
undergraduate students of hitting a computer key they were not allowed to 
touch. A part of the participants had been manipulated into a state of mem-
ory distrust. In this way, it was possible to examine the effect of memory 
distrust on false confessions. Findings show that state memory distrust could 
be evoked by giving participants negative bogus feedback. More than half of 
the participants (52%) falsely confessed to having caused the computer to 
crash, and of these, 58.5% internalised their confession. Furthermore, the 
overall confession rate was not influenced by lowered memory confidence. 
But findings demonstrate that participants with elevated state memory dis-
trust (induced by negative feedback prior to the computer test) internalised 
their false confessions more often than participants who had not received 
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this negative feedback. This study, therefore, indicates that memory distrust 
may be an antecedent of internalised false confessions. 
In Chapter 7, the main findings of the studies presented in this thesis are 
summarised and discussed. Also, it looks at limitations and suggestions for 
future research as well as practical implications. 
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Dit proefschrift gaat over geheugenwantrouwen in de strafrechtelijke con-
text. Geheugenwantrouwen kan worden gedefinieerd als een toestand waar-
in mensen een groot wantrouwen koesteren over hun herinneringen, waar-
door ze extra vatbaar worden voor externe suggesties (Gudjonsson, 2003). 
Je kunt geheugenwantrouwen tegenkomen in zowel de klinische als forensi-
sche praktijk. Voornamelijk in de forensische praktijk kan geheugenwan-
trouwen verstrekkende gevolgen hebben. Tot dusverre is geheugenwan-
trouwen alleen beschreven aan de hand van casuïstiek. Dit proefschrift is 
een eerste poging om geheugenwantrouwen empirisch te onderzoeken. We 
hebben ons bij het uitvoeren van de studies vooral gericht op de strafrechte-
lijke context. 
Hoofdstuk 1 begint met twee gevalsbeschrijvingen van valse bekentenis-
sen waarbij geheugenwantrouwen een belangrijke rol heeft gespeeld. Dit 
hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van onderzoek waarin geheugenwantrouwen 
in verband werd gebracht met pseudoherinneringen en valse bekentenissen. 
Het behandelt ook andere domeinen waarin geheugenwantrouwen een vaak 
voorkomend verschijnsel is, zoals onderzoek bij ouderen of bij patiënten met 
een obsessief-compulsieve stoornis. Tevens worden in dit hoofdstuk de on-
derzoeksvragen besproken die in de loop van dit proefschrift beantwoord 
worden, te weten: Wat is geheugenwantrouwen? Wat zijn de onderliggende 
mechanismen van geheugenwantrouwen? Hoe kun je geheugenwantrou-
wen het best meten? Zijn mensen die geheugenwantrouwen hebben vat-
baarder voor het ontwikkelen van pseudoherinneringen of valse bekentenis-
sen? 
Dit proefschrift is opgedeeld in twee delen; het eerste deel bestaat uit 
studies naar geheugenwantrouwen als een soort persoonlijkheidstrek, ge-
naamd ‘trait memory distrust’ (Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4). Deze variant van 
geheugenwantrouwen komt voor bij mensen die chronisch twijfelen aan 
hun geheugen. Het tweede deel richt zich op geheugenwantrouwen als een 
momentane toestand, te weten ‘state memory distrust’ (Hoofdstukken 5 en 
6). 
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft een valideringsstudie van de bewerkte Nederland-
se versie van de Squire Subjective Memory Questionnaire (SSMQ). Deze 
vragenlijst kan gebruikt worden om geheugenwantrouwen als persoonlijk-
heidstrek te meten. De SSMQ is een valide en betrouwbaar instrument. In 
de forensische praktijk kan dit instrument gebruikt worden om kwetsbare 
verdachten in een vroeg stadium te identificeren. Op deze manier kan de 
druk tijdens het verhoor worden aangepast aan de mate van geheugenwan-
trouwen dat zich bij de verdachte manifesteert. In het beste geval zal dit het 
aantal valse bekentenissen verkleinen. 
Om een beter zicht te krijgen op geheugenwantrouwen, is in de Hoofd-
stukken 2, 3 en 4 een aantal factoren onderzocht waarvan verwacht wordt 
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dat ze gerelateerd zouden zijn aan geheugenwantrouwen. Uit deze hoofd-
stukken kan geconcludeerd worden dat geheugenwantrouwen samengaat 
met een hogere leeftijd en meer cognitieve fouten. Dit zijn kleine vergissin-
gen in het geheugen, de aandacht, of de motoriek. Daarnaast lijken mensen 
die hun geheugen wantrouwen ook daadwerkelijk een slechter geheugen te 
hebben. Bovendien zijn ze vaak ook depressiever en meegaander dan indivi-
duen die zelfzeker zijn over hun geheugen. 
Tegengesteld aan de verwachtingen blijkt uit Hoofdstuk 3 dat geheu-
genwantrouwen niet samenhangt met een hogere suggestibiliteit en pseu-
doherinneringen. Dit kan komen doordat het type geheugenwantrouwen 
dat in deze studie werd bekeken (‘trait memory distrust’) verschilt van het 
type dat vaak in gevalsbeschrijvingen centraal staat (‘state memory distrust’). 
Een andere verklaring voor dit nulresultaat is dat het paradigma dat werd 
gebruikt om pseudoherinneringen uit te lokken, de DRM-taak, niet het 
meest geschikte paradigma is geweest. 
De studie beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4 heeft daarom een ander paradigma 
gebruikt, waarbij suggesties worden gebruikt om pseudoherinneringen uit te 
lokken. Deze studie laat zien dat mensen die hun geheugen wantrouwen 
eerder foutieve informatie accepteren dan mensen die zeker zijn van hun 
geheugen. Mensen met geheugenwantrouwen zijn dus suggestiever en 
daardoor eerder geneigd pseudoherinneringen te ontwikkelen. Dit spreekt 
de resultaten van Hoofdstuk 3 tegen, maar de resultaten uit dit hoofdstuk 
wegen zwaarder aangezien hier gebruik is gemaakt van een paradigma met 
een hogere ecologische validiteit. 
De studies die tot nu toe in dit proefschrift zijn beschreven, richtten zich 
allemaal op geheugenwantrouwen als persoonlijkheidstrek. De volgende 
twee hoofdstukken gaan over geheugenwantrouwen als een momentane 
toestand. De studie beschreven in Hoofdstuk 5 onderzocht of geheugenwan-
trouwen kan worden uitgelokt door verhoortechnieken die ook vaak valse 
bekentenissen teweegbrengen. Deze studie liet zien dat geheugenwantrou-
wen en de neiging tot vals bekennen met elkaar samenhangen. De verhoor-
technieken hadden echter niet hetzelfde effect op geheugenwantrouwen en 
valse bekentenissen. Zo waren proefpersonen het meest geneigd hun geheu-
gen te wantrouwen als er een suggestie was aangedragen van geheugenpro-
blemen. Aan de andere kant zorgde vals technisch bewijs ervoor dat de 
meeste mensen ertoe neigden om een valse bekentenis af te leggen. Omdat 
deze studie een gedachte-experiment betrof, kunnen geen conclusies ge-
trokken worden over causaliteit. 
Het experiment uit Hoofdstuk 6 werd opgezet om een uitspraak te doen 
over causaliteit. Studenten werden beschuldigd aan de hand van het compu-
ter crash paradigma (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). Een deel van de proefperso-
nen werd door middel van valse negatieve feedback gemanipuleerd in een 
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toestand van geheugenwantrouwen. Op deze manier was het mogelijk om 
de effecten van geheugenwantrouwen op valse bekentenissen te onderzoe-
ken. De resultaten laten zien dat het geven van valse negatieve feedback 
geheugenwantrouwen uitlokt. Iets meer dan de helft van de proefpersonen 
(52%) legde een valse bekentenis af en gaf dus toe dat zij verantwoordelijk 
waren voor het crashen van de computer. Van deze groep geloofde 58,5% 
daadwerkelijk dat zij de computercrash zelf hadden veroorzaakt. Zij legden 
dus een geïnternaliseerde valse bekentenis af. Het aantal valse bekentenissen 
was niet hoger in de groep studenten die hun geheugen begonnen te wan-
trouwen, maar de proportie geïnternaliseerde valse bekentenissen was wel 
hoger in deze groep vergeleken met de groep die geen valse negatieve feed-
back kreeg. Deze studie demonstreert dat geheugenwantrouwen best een 
voorloper van geïnternaliseerde valse bekentenissen kan zijn. 
In het afsluitende Hoofdstuk 7 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen sa-
mengevat en de eventuele beperkingen van de studies besproken. Ook 
wordt een aantal suggesties gedaan voor toekomstig onderzoek. Het hoofd-
stuk eindigt met de praktische implicaties van de bevindingen. 
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